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GaudapAda (was Re: The Theism of the Upanishads)
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To: alt-hindu@uunet.UU.NET
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Subject: GaudapAda (was Re: The Theism of the Upanishads)
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From: vidya@cco.caltech.edu (Vidyasankar Sundaresan)
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Date: 22 Jun 1994 02:03:41 GMT
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Distribution: world
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Newsgroups: alt.hindu
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Organization: California Institute of Technology, Pasadena
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References: <2tnkn0$f5p@pdx1.world.net>
This continues on the discussion Mani and I have been having here. It has
long been a criticism of Advaita that it is nothing but Buddhism in
disguise. It is not necessarily clear in today's circumstances why this
should be a criticism. After all, mainstream Hinduism has accepted the
Buddha as an incarnation of Vishnu, and the Buddha's teaching is not
necessarily something to be ashamed of. From a Vaishnavite perspective
however, it is, because Vishnu is said to have incarnated as the Buddha to
delude evil-minded people by his teaching. From the point of view of
theism in general, it is again a serious charge, because Advaita is the
dominant Vedantic tradition. If it were proved that Advaita is Buddhism
(which is essentially non-theistic) in disguise, Advaita can no longer
claim to be representative of a theistic tradition. Also, "Buddhism in
disguise" raises unpleasant possibilities - because of the disguise, it is
not fully Buddhism, but because it is Buddhism it is not Vedanta either.
In Mani's words, "true theism is better served by Visishtadvaita than by
Advaita." And - "welcome to Visishtadvaita, welcome to Vedanta."
Two pieces of evidence are cited to "prove" that Advaita is "prachanna
bauddham". The first is the use of the term mAyA in Advaita. Thus
Mani - To further show pure Advaita's origin in Buddhism, take its usage
of the word "mAyA". Even adherents of Advaita today accept that
nowhere in the principal Upanishads, the Gita, and the
Brahma-sutras, does the word mAyA appear as used by Advaitins.
[By pure Advaita, Mani is referring to Sankaracharya's Advaita, not the
Suddha Advaita system of Vallabhacharya.]
I shall reply to this in a subsequent post. This post concentrates on the
other basis for this criticism.
The second "evidence" for the "prachanna bauddham" criticism of Advaita
uses GaudapAda as its basis. Sankara is the most important figure in
Advaita, as his works are extensive and serve to define basic Advaita
tenets today. GaudapAda was Sankara's paramaguru i.e. teacher's teacher.
The traditional Advaita guru parampara - lineage of gurus - traces Sankara
through his teacher Govinda to GaudapAda and ultimately to Narayana, God
Himself. Needless to say, most orthodox Advaitins simply do not care to
respond to such critics. For them, the question does not arise. GaudapAda
was an Advaita Vedantin, and fortunately or otherwise, the criticism is
not worth answering. They just ask their critics to understand Advaita
well before daring to criticize it. Unfortunately, it is easy to criticize
what one does not like, whether one understands it or not. Also,
traditional Advaitins work among relatively isolated scholastic, and
mostly monastic communities in India, and their work is in Sanskrit. To
the outside world, it may seem as if the criticism has not been answered,
and as if Advaita Vedanta is tainted by its perceived association with
Buddhism.
Hence I have tried to treat GaudapAda's work with special attention, to
the best of my ability. Here, I endeavor to show that GaudapAda
#1) is an Advaita Vedantin first and last,
#2) is extremely conversant with the Madhyamika system of Buddhism,
#3) uses Madhyamika techniques to finally establish Advaita Vedanta.
Of these, no one doubts #2, so I shall take it for granted. Mani quotes
from the GaudapAdIya kArikAs and shows the similarlity to NAgArjuna's
mAdhyamika kArikAs. That alone proves #2, though of course Mani would take
that as proof that Advaita is nothing but Buddhism. In #1, everybody again
agrees that GaudapAda is an Advaitin. Since Gaudapada is seen to be a
Vedantin over and above being an Advaitin, it is my aim to prove the
"Vedantin first and last" part. This is immediately seen if #3 is proved.
To prove #3 however. we need to understand what Buddhism itself is all
about. Gautama the Buddha himself taught only the "four noble truths" -
duhkhasatya, samudAyasatya, nirodhasatya and mArgasatya. He refused to
answer questions such as "Does Atman exist?" or "Does God exist?" His
silence on this issue is usually taken to be a denial. After the Buddha,
many schools rose in interpreting his teachings, broadly classifiable as
the older hinAyAna schools and the later mahAyAna schools. The schools of
hinAyAna Buddhism are theravAdins, the sarvAstivAdins (sautrAntika and
vaibhAshika schools) and the andhakas. The Andhakas held the view that
everything, including the physical body was only mind. They are also
credited with composing the prajnAparAmitA sutrAs which formed the basic
scripture of the mahAyAna schools.
The andhaka school also held that since they were able to continue in the
meditative state for a long time, vijnAna (consciousness) was not
necessarily momentary. This conflicted with the original principle that
everything was momentary. The various mahAyAna schools tried to resolve
this problem. The vijnAnavAdins, also called YogAchAras, held that
1) vijnAna was without any determination.
2) This indeterminateness was called SUnya.
3) This vijnAna was the Absolute.
Thus by starting with the principle that everything was momentary,
Buddhism had arrived at a school which postulated an Absolute. The logical
question that arose at this point was - is this Absolute eternal? The
vijnAnavAdins held different views about this matter. For some, the
question is without meaning, because vijnAna is without any positive
determinations whatsoever; time being a determinate characteristic,
eternality cannot be defined for vijnAna. Some other vijnAnavAdins held
that vijnAna was also momentary, but it was not in the sense of a moment
in time, but an eternal moment that has no end.
The next important school of mahAyAna is the MAdhyamika, founded by
nAgArjuna, a philosopher of great dialectical skill. His skill extended to
showing that the major tenet of momentariness and even the idea of the
Buddha himself were all self-contradictory and false. Without going into
the details of his debates with rival Buddhist schools, it is sufficient
to note here that he succeeded in establishing the supremacy of his school
in India, from where it later spread to Tibet, China and Japan. The
important philosophical entities in MAdhyamika philosophy are SUnya and
mAyA. Both SUnya and mAyA are defined in his school in terms of the
four-fold negation - neither Being, nor non-Being, nor neither, nor both.
NAgArjuna did not like to call SUnya as vijnAna because that meant
characterization in terms of consciousness. The mAdhyamika school is so
called because NAgArjuna claimed to represent the Buddha's teaching truly
- the Buddha is reputed to have said 'That everything exists is one
extreme; that nothing exists is another; tathAgata teaches the medium
view."
One can see the gradual development of ideas similar to the Upanishads
here, though of course the emphasis and the terms used are different. By
contradicting the original hinAyAna tenet of the momentariness of
everything, mahAyAna Buddhism had thrown up the idea of the eternal. Thus
for vijnAnavAda, either vijnAna is eternal by default, or is momentary for
an eternal moment. In an attempt to save the momentariness of the ultimate
entity also, vijnAnavAda had come up with the idea of an "eternal moment".
MAdhyamika on the other hand, came up with the concept of SUnya as the
ultimate, but this SUnya was neither Being, nor non-Being, nor neither nor
both. The important point to note is that six to seven centuries after the
Buddha, by postulating an Absolute eternal, mahAyAna ends up almost
converting Buddhism into Vedanta.
In the earlier post of mine, in which I quote the Vishnu PurANa, I quote
the purANa's note of the basic tenet of Advaita - Brahman is Eternal
Absolute Existence. Nothing positive and deterministic can be said of this
Brahman except that It eternally exists, therefore Brahman is Eternal
Existence. This is a direct consequence of the doctrine of "Neti, neti" in
the BrihadAraNyaka upanishad, the same upanishad which also goes on to
affirm the identity of this Brahman with the Atman.
Along comes GaudapAda, the Advaitin. He notices at once that the
mAdhyamika argument is but a variant of the Upanishadic argument of Neti,
neti. The only difference between the Advaitic Absolute and the mAdhyamika
Absolute is in the definition. Advaita's Absolute, the Brahman is Being.
MAdhyamika's Absolute, the SUnya is the four-fold negation. The Advaita
criticism of the mAdhyamika position is that to recognize the four-fold
negation, one has first to identify Being. Without accepting that there
exists an entity that is Being, no one can cognize non-Being. The argument
goes as follows. Non-Being can be said only of non-existent entities, like
the son of a barren woman or the horns of a hare. Thus non-Being cannot
give rise to Being. On the other hand, Being is necessary to cognize
non-Being, for there is a person who recognizes the non-Being. That being
the case for one of the categories of the four-fold negation, the Absolute
can only be said to be Being. Without Being, even this four-fold negation
cannot be recognized.
That is exactly what GaudapAda sets out to state in his kArikAs. He does
not need to conduct polemics against other schools of Buddhism, as the
mAdhyamikAs had already contradicted all earlier schools. This
contradiction is not just a simple one, for the mAdhyamika school and the
vijnAnavAda school had both ended up with the category of the Absolute
Eternal - the category of the Vedanta. All that was now needed to be
proved was that the Absolute of mAdhyamika needed to be further refined.
By accepting all the discussions of the mAdhyamika philosophers, but
pointing out the untenability of the major conclusion of mAdhyamika,
GaudapAda leaves no choice for mAdhyamika but to convert itself fully to
Vedanta. GaudapAda does this in the time honored Indian method -
assimilation instead of conversion. He could have stressed the importance
of the testimony of the Upanishads to disprove the Buddhists. The plain
answer of the Buddhist would have been "Your Vedas are not scripture for
me - therefore you are wrong." This is really an impasse, getting one
nowhere. Unlike some other religions which tell the rival "My revelation
is the only one" and attempt to convert him, Hinduism does not force the
Vedas on anybody. The attempt is to meet the rival on his own ground, and
see points of similarity. The Bhagavat Gita's assimilation of the Samkhya
philosophy is a classic case of this. GaudapAda does the exactly similar
thing with Buddhism in his writing. He would much rather refute the
Buddhist by using a logic that the Buddhist understands, than claim the
authority of revelation, something that is totally irrelevant for the
Buddhist.
Mani - How else can you explain his equation of the dream and waking
states, a position characteristic of Vijnanavada Buddhism?
GaudapAda does not so much equate the dreaming and waking states as point
out their similarity from the paramArtha viewpoint. Similarity is not
congruence. He also takes care in his first book (called Agama) of the
kArikAs to define the waking, the dreaming, the deep sleep and the turiya
states in totally Vedanta terms. The meditation on Om as Brahman is
extolled - a classically Vedantic doctrine. Throughout the second book
(vaitathya - unreality), the ultimate Reality of the Self is affirmed by
using vijnAnavAda techniques. For example, in the kArikAs 1 - 10 of the
second book, he shows that the objects of the waking and the dreaming
states are alike as far the ultimate reality is concerned. Because on the
surface this looks as if he endorses vijnAnavAda, he clarifies his thought
by using the classically Vedantic doctrine that the Self apparently
creates the self by the self through its own power. He also mentions
various fundamentally Vedantic categories - prANa, bhUta, guNa, tattva,
bhoktr, bhogya etc. in the kArikAs 16 - 30, as the various ways in which
people know the Self. GaudapAda's grand-disciple Sankara, clarifies the
situation further. He is not refuting his paramaguru's conclusions; he is
only taking care to state in unambiguous terms the position of Advaita as
regards this issue, something that GaudapAda doesn't really need to do as
far as his major objective is concerned.
The third book (Advaita - non-duality) sets the basic tenets of Advaita
Vedanta - as the Upanishads affirm identity between the Atman and Brahman,
in reality there is no bondage. The Atman is always Brahman, though the
jIva knows it not. Since Brahman is unborn, the Atman is also unborn. The
technique of ajAtivAda is used to affirm that the world is one of
appearances, devoid of ultimate reality. Non-duality can give rise to
apparent duality and yet remain unaffected. In fact, in this book, the
argument used is a combination of the spanda technique, which is Saiva in
origin, with the ajAtivAda. I need hardly quote here the BrihadAraNyaka
upanishad passage which affirms this highest identity. Visishtadviata and
other schools of Vedanta still have to account for this unambiguous
Upanishadic assertion of non-duality satisfactorily.
The fourth book (alAtaSanti - the peace of the firebrand) shows the
maximum use of Buddhist techniques. The metaphor of a firebrand being
waved about and creating an appearance of a circle of fire is admittedly
Buddhist in origin. However, Buddhists never affirm an eternal Being in
their ajAtivAda. GaudapAda's use of ajAtivAda assumes the eternal nature
of Brahman. Again GaudapAda's purpose here is to maintain the eternality
of Brahman, something the Buddhist does not consider at all. The Buddhist
uses ajAtivAda for momentariness, GaudapAda uses ajAtivAda to show that
there has to exist one eternal. Finally the four-fold negation of the
Buddhist is examined. KArikAs 82 - 86 explain that the Lord (the exact
word he uses is bhagavAn) is untouched by and above the four-fold
negation. however, it cannot be said that mAyA is also untouched by this
four-fold negation. Finally, at the end of it all comes the master coup -
idam buddhena na bhAshitam - this was not said by the Buddha.
What was not said by the Buddha? Anything about the dharmas or about
consciousness! Mani views this to mean - "the Buddhists are close to us,
but just need to say a little more"! How much more is that little more!
And how much it changes the character of Buddhism! It is not a little
thing, to accept the reality of the very same entity that historically
Buddhist speculation started by negating. From the Advaita point of view,
the Buddhists were right in many conclusions they reached, therefore it is
not wrong to accept those conclusions. Mani thinks "idam buddhena na
bhAshitam" does not mean a specific contradiction of Buddhist doctrine. I
would ask him whether he considers the rejection of Euclid's parallel
postulate by non-Euclidean geomtries "not sufficient contradiction" of
Euclidean geometry. It is funny that Mani finds "much truth" in Buddhist
thought, but cannot find any truth in Advaita, and in fact uses "Buddhism
in disguise" as a criticism of Advaita.
See what de la Vallee Poussin has to say about GaudapAda's work -
"GaudapAda does not just use Buddhist works and sayings to adjust them to
his Vedantic design; nay more, he finds pleasure in double entendre." See
furthermore what he says about vijnAnavAda itself - "At least in some of
its ontological characteristics, vijnAnavAda is like Vedantism in
disguise." (Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1900, p. 132) This is
the very opposite of what Mani is saying. It is not Advaita which has its
origins in vijnAnavAda or mAdhyamika but a similarity of ontological
interpretations. The final proof that Buddhism had itself transformed into
a kind of Vedanta is seen from the description of TathAgata as personal
God - tathAgata is endowed with power and perfection; he has completely
eliminated passion and karma and the obscurations of kleSAvaraNa and
jneyAvaraNa; he is sarvajna, and he is sarvakArajna, having a full
knowledge of the truth and the empirical world likewise. I have no doubt
Mani would be perfectly happy with such a description - it is almost
copied from a description of Vishnu. Thus in addition to accepting an
Absolute that the hinAyAna schools deny, mAdhyamika Buddhism had come up
with the idea of the Buddhist equivalent of the Saguna Brahman also.
Little wonder then that in India itself, the Buddha got assimilated as an
avatAra of Vishnu. As an aside, this is important to note for those who
argue that Buddhism was persecuted and driven out from India by the
"Brahminical Revival". The history of later Buddhism in India is better
understood as assimilation into the very culture from which it originated,
rather than as persecution.
To recapitulate, GaudapAda is not mixing Vedanta and Buddhist ideas, nor
is he intent on explaining Vedanta according to Buddhism. He is only using
Buddhist techniques, not Buddhist tenets, to explain Vedanta. Quite
probably this is an outcome of his having had to debate with various
Buddhist philosophers. Thus he uses Buddhist-like arguments to come to
Vedanta conclusions, thereby contradicting the Buddhists by default. Most
importantly, he is pointing out by means of his usage of Buddhist
techniques, that over the centuries Buddhism had itself moved closer and
closer to Vedanta. That is the full force of "idam buddhena na bhashitam".
Buddha lived in the 5th cent. B. C., Gaudapada at least a full millenium
later. He is in fact being extremely subtle in telling the Buddhist, "Over
this millenium you have been expanding on the Buddha's thought only to end
up saying what we have been saying all along."
This represents a philosophical conquest over Buddhism, at least in India.
The conquest itself was made easy by the development of the mAdhyamika
school. This school is inherently so close to Vedanta that just one point
that they conceded to Advaita - the acceptance of Existence as the
Absolute, turned the tables. GaudapAda did not have to contradict Buddhism
elaborately.
Both mImAmSA tradition and Buddhist tradition hold Advaita Vedanta
responsible for the ultimate fizzling out of Buddhism as a separate
religion in India. Without the advent of GaudapAda and Sankara, the
Upanishadic religion would have died out in India. KumArila, PrabhAkara
and Mandana Misra were very successful in establishing pUrva mImAmSA -
the philosophy of Vedic ritualism - among the people. Buddhism and this
ritualism would have been the only major religions worthy of note from the
point of view of philosophy, if not for Advaita. All other schools of
Vedanta have defined themselves only in opposition to Advaita. Thus
Visishtadvaita understands Brahman to be Saguna always and denies the
ultimate reality of the Nirguna Brahman, bheda-abheda says both Saguna and
Nirguna Brahman are real and Dvaita relies more on mythology than on the
Upanishads for its religion.
My earlier posting on the Vishnu purANa presents irrefutable evidence that
Advaita as a Vedantic tradition existed prior to GaudapAda and
independently of Buddhism. Seeing Advaita's origin in Buddhism is seeing
something that doesn't exist. In fact, Mani's analogy using Sankhya fits
not at all here. The only difference between Sankhya and the Vedanta is
the role of prakriti. The only difference between mAdhyAmika Buddhism and
Vedanta is the existence of the Brahman. Mani is wrong only in his major
claim. GaudapAda does not derive from Buddhism, the truth is that Buddhism
itself crystallized into a form that was easily absorbed by the mainstream
Vedanta. This is not surprising, given the fact that early Buddhism and
the Upanishads themselves are not far apart from each other in time - they
developed in the same milieu. Further developments of the two streams of
thought paralleled one another very closely. Paradoxically, they were so
parallel, Buddhism merged into Vedanta and lost its separate identity.
MAdhyamika Buddhism is the official school of Tibetan Buddhism, and the
Dalai Lama himself agreed recently that his school was very close to
Vedanta, except for accepting the reality of the Atman. On deeper
reflection, this is nothing more than just a similarity, because the
reality of the Atman is the most important tenet of Advaita - Brahma
satyam; ayamAtmA Brahma.
Vidyasankar