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PAKISTAN'S BLASPHEMY - Exploitation Of Religion For Political Ends
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To: Alt Hindu <editor@rbhatnagar.ececs.uc.edu>
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Subject: PAKISTAN'S BLASPHEMY - Exploitation Of Religion For Political Ends
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From: Rajiv Varma <rvarma@ccaix.jsums.edu>
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Date: Thu, 30 Mar 1995 04:28:31 -0600 (CST)
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From rvarma@ccaix.jsums.edu Thu Mar 30 05: 21:03 1995
PAKISTAN'S BLASPHEMY - Exploitation Of Religion For Political Ends
By A. G. NOORANI - From The FRONTLINE, April 7, 1995, INDIA.
AUGUST 17, 1947 was a Sunday.The Anglican Archdeacon had arranged for a
special service of prayer and thanksgiving in the Holy Trinity Church in
Karachi. He had also composed a special prayer in which the founder of the
new state of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, was mentioned. When Jinnah
heard of it, he asked that he might be allowed to attend the service, in
state. He did. As Wilfred Russell remarked in his book Indian Summer,
Jinnah "who knew only too well the orthodox fervour of many Muslims, might
well have been taking a political risk in making this graceful and moving
gesture to the Christian community of Karachi".
In 1995, two Christians - the 14 year-old Salamat Masih and his uncle
Rehmat Masih - were forced to flee from Pakistan to save their lives
despite their acquittal, on February 23, by a Division Bench of the Lahore
High Court of charges of blasphemy of which they were convicted on
February 9. Everyone knew the charges were false. Salamat could not
possibly have scrawled the writings on the wall; he is illiterate. The
acquittal was denounced not only by the mullahs but also by prosecution
counsel. One of them, Rashid Murtaza Qureshi, stormed out of the courtroom
screaming it was a "kangaroo court". Another, Inayatullah Hasmi, alleged
that the Government had dictated the ruling. "The decision of the court is
not its own. "
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's spontaneous reaction gave her away.
"Shocked and surprised" as she was, she deplored its timing - just weeks
before her coveted trip to the U.S. This is not to suggest that she
approves of the blasphemy laws which disgrace Pakistan's statute book.
Indeed, she had proposed amendments to prevent their abuse, as distinct
from their deserved repeal. But she backtracked even on that.
Pakistan's blasphemy laws deserve to be studied closely in themselves. But
more instructive is the political climate which produced such appalling
legislation over the years. Dr. Zaki Bedawi, Principal of the Muslim
College in London, said on the BBC on February 23 that there is no
foundation for such laws in Islam. It is the exploitation of religion for
political ends, a game in which all parties participate, which has brought
Pakistan to the sorry state in which it now finds itself.
Not long ago, the Religious Affairs Minister in the Nawaz Sharif
Government, Abdus Sattar Niazi, called Benazir Bhutto an infidel for her
criticisms of judgments of the Federal Shariat Court; criticism which, he
said, "have made her liable to execution". Asma Jehangir, counsel for the
Masihs, touched the roots of the problem when, on February 23 on the BBC,
she pleaded for a rapprochement between the Government and the Opposition.
The report of Justices M. Munir and M. R. Kayani as the Court of Inquiry
into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 - the Munir report, as it is
popularly known - traced the beginnings of the abuse of religion in the
political contest. It began with a campaign against the Ahmadis. Justice
Munir bearded one mullah after another in his own den, as it were, by
asking them to define who a Muslim was and what constituted an Islamic
state. The report, a veritable classic, is relevant still and not in
Pakistan alone, either. "No two ulama have agreed before us as to the
definition of a Muslim." Neither Government, Central and Provincial, gave
a fight to the charlatans. Both lost power. Ideologically Pakistan was
being transformed radically in the 1950s. The results are there for all to
see.
Twenty years after the Munir report, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto repeated the
mistake and met the same fate. Following the riots in May 1974 - a repeat
of the ones of 1953 - he yielded to the demand to declare Ahmadis
non-Muslims. On September 7, 1974, the National Assembly unanimously
adopted the Constitution (Second) Amendment Act, 1974. It added Ahmadis to
the list of minorities and included a clause in Article 260 of the
Constitution which took Ahmadis out of the definition of a Muslim. Thirty
Years earlier, in Srinagar on May 28, 1944, Jinnah had categorically
rejected precisely such a suggestion that the Ahmadis, also known as
Qadianis, are not Muslims.
When Zia-ul-Haq stagcd a military coup in July 1977 he had no option but
to use religion in the service of power. This was the "ideology" he
propagated, an "ideology" by which the likes of Nawaz Sharif and very many
in Pakistan's politics, media and academia still swear.
What are known as the blasphemy laws formed part of the legislation for
Pakistan's "Islamisation" by a military despot. They are in the form of
amendments to Pakistan's Penal Code (PPC), an adaptation of Macaulay's
Indian Penal Code (1860). Chapter XV contains "offences relating to
religion", from destroying a place of worship (Section 295) to uttering
words with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings. Later, Section
295-A was inserted to punish "deliberate and malicious acts intended to
outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion". Two
features are common to the provisions in Chapter XV - applicability to all
religions and the ingredient of the deliberate intention of the offender
in the definition of the offences.
When Section 295-A was discussed in the Central Assembly, Jinnah sounded a
warning: "I thoroughly endorse the principle, that while this measure
should aim at those undesirable persons who indulge in wanton vilification
or attack upon the religion of any particular class or upon the founders
and prophets of a religion, we must also secure this very important and
fundamental principle that those who are engaged in historical works,
those who are engaged in bona fide and honest criticisms of a religion,
shall be protected." (emphasis added, throughout).
Few share values such as these in Pakistan. In 1980, Section 298-A was
inserted in the PPC, by which the use of derogatory remarks, "by words...
or by imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly", in
respect of persons revered in Islam was made a criminal offence punishable
with up to three years' imprisonment.
In 1986 the PPC was amended by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1986. It
added the blasphemy law "under Section 295-C to the PPC. It reads thus:
"295-C: Use of derogatory remarks, etc. in respect of the Holy Prophet:
Whoever by words, either spoken or by visible representation, or by any
imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the
sacred name of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), shall be punished
with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine." A
liberal judge would construe this very strictly. But liberals are an
endangered species in Pakistan.
In October 1990, the Federal Shariat Court, set up in 1980 to "examine and
decide the question whether any law or provision of law is repugnant to
the injunctions of Islam" (Article 203-D of the Constitution), ruled that
"the penalty for contempt of the Holy Prophet... is death and nothing
else". It also noted that "no one after the Holy Prophet... exercised or
was authorised the right of reprieve or pardon". This is false, of course.
The Court directed the Government of Pakistan to effect the necessary
legal change and added, "in case this is not done by 30 April, 1991 the
words 'or punishment for life' in Section 295-C, PPC, shall cease to have
effect on that date". Decisions by the Federal Shariat Court are binding
on the Government under Article 203-D(3) of the Constitution. The
Government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did not file an appeal against
the decision making the death penalty the only punishment available for
blasphemy.
In April 1994, the Lahore High Court extended the application of the
blasphemy law. It ruled that defiling the names of "all the true prophets
of Allah mentioned in the Koran", including Abraham and Jesus, constitute
blasphemy. The Federal Shariat Court in its judgment of 1990 had already
recommended that the words "any prophet" be substituted for "the Holy
Prophet", meaning the Prophet Mohammed, in Section 295-C.
This resume draws on a document produced by an organisation some in India
love to hate. It is Amnesty International's report Pakistan: Use and Abuse
of Blasphemy Laws, published in July 1994. It mentions that "Commentators
in Pakistan have pointed out that the recent decision of the Lahore High
Court could open the door to further litigation as the ruling reflects the
Muslim interpretation of such prophets who may be viewed differently in
other faiths". Most notably, Jesus Christ whom Christians revere as son of
God and Muslims as a prophet of God. Will the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
pillory Christians for their beliefs?
Besides Amnesty's report, there is the report of a mission sent by the
International Commission of Jurists entitled Pakistan: Human Rights after
Martial Law, published in April 1987. It has a resume of anti-Ahmadi
legisla- tion: "A more direct interference with the religious beliefs and
practices of the Ahmadis came with the adoption, also during martial law,
of the Anti-Islamic Activities of Quadiani, Lahori Group and Ahmadis
(Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance (No. 20 of 1984). (The Lahori Group
consists of the followers of those who seceded from among the Ahmadis
shortly after Mirza Ghulam Ahmed's death: in 1908. They do not accept the
latter's prophethood but adhere to his views regarding jehad and the death
of Christ and are always included in the legislation directed at the
Ahmadis.)
"This ordinance, through the introduction of Sections 298-B and 298-C into
the Pakistan Penal Code, made Ahmadis liable to a penalty of up to three
years' imprisonment for a range of activities which identified their faith
with the Islamic faith or involved its propagation. Thus, they were
thenceforth prohibited from using the various epithets, descriptions and
titles discussed above in referring to or addressing any person other than
those listed in the ordinance and could no longer refer to their place or
worship as Masjid (Sechon 298-B (1). Nor could they thereafter refer to
the mode or form of call to prayers followed by their faith as Azan or
recite Azan as used by Muslims (Section 298-B (2).
"Furthermore, any Ahmadi who 'directly or indirectly poses himself as a
Muslim, or calls, or refers to his faith as Islam, or preaches or
propagates his faith, or involves others to accept his faith, by words,
either spoken or written, or by visible representations, or in any manner
whatsoever outrageous the religious feelings of Muslims' is also liable to
imprisonment (Section 298-C)."
The report points out that the effect of these additions to the PPC has
been to impose stringent limitations on the religious freedom of the
Ahmadis. Not only are they prevented from using many of the Islamic forms
that have been part of their traditional religious practices, but they are
also expected to repudiate a central tenet of their beliefs as a result of
the prohibition on associating themselves or their faith in any way with
Islam.
The ICJ's report cites instances of prosecutions under these laws -
displaying extracts from the Koran; printing a verse from the Koran on a
wedding invitation card; displaying in shops the Kalima Tayyiba (meaning
there is no god but Allah and Mohammed is his Messenger.)
Amnesty's report documents meticulously the systematic abuse of the
blasphemy laws in Pakistan; laws which are intrinsically susceptible to
abuse. "The available evidence in all of these cases suggests that charges
were brought as a measure to intimidate and punish members of minority
religious communities, or as a consequence of accusations brought by
individuals motivated by personal enmity or a desire to gain political
advantage...
"A common feature of accusations of blasphemy in Pakistan is the manner in
which they are uncritically accepted by prosecuting authorities, who
themselves may face intimidation, threats and accusations should they fail
to accept them. Similarly, ill-treatment is frequently reported, and may
be exac- erbated by the emotional manner in which charges of blasphemy are
brought and publicised and those accused vilified by their accusers."
Manzoor Masih, who was charged along with Salamat and Rehmat Masih, was
shot dead near the Lahore High Court on April 5, 1994 while under trial.
Last year there were grave instances of killings of members of minority
communities in Lahore and Gujranwala. "The Government of Pakistan has not
publicly condemned such acts and taken all possible measures to ensure the
safety of members of religious minorities. None of the major political
parties have publicly condemned the incidents," Amnesty's report noted.
During a debate in the National Assembly following the murder of Manzoor
Masih, a former Supreme Court Judge, Dorab Patel, Chairman of the Human
Rights Commission of Pakistan, declared that the blasphemy law should be
amened as it contributes to religious "fanaticism". He was interrupted by
Maulvi Azam Tariq of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, a Sunni Muslim
organisation, who shouted that "anyone who commits blasphemy will meet the
fate of Manzoor Masih".
Amnesty's report recalled: "When Naimat Ahmer was killed by a student who
believed that he had blasphemed and considered himself to be acting in
accordance with Islam, the police officers arresting the student
reportedly embraced him and praised him for his commitment to Islam. The
police investigation in this case appeared to have been very slow and
geared to delaying trial and conviction. The student was, however,
sentenced to 14 years' rigorous imprisonment in June 1994."
Many lawyers and members of the lower judiciary exhibit the same bias
against persons charged with blasphemy. In almost all the cases known to
Amnesty International no local lawyer was willing to take up the case of
the defendant. For instance, the case of Tahir Iqbal, arrested in December
1990 on a charge of blasphemy, was not taken up by any lawyer until May
1991, when a lawyer of the non-governmental Human Rights Commission of
Pakistan assumed his defence.
Trials are invarlably accompanied by agitation by local clergy baying for
the blood of the accused. The report has detailed descriptions of nine
cases; the last being that of the two Masihs.
The sectarian strife which is tearing Karachi apart is a direct result of
the Islamisation policy. If that policy has survived Zia, it is because it
pandered to the prejudices of large sections of Pakistan's society.
Analysing the basic orientation of the intelligentsia in The Muslim, an
Islamabad daily (January 8 and 9, 1995), Dr. Mohammad Waseem remarked:
"Our mainstream national consciousness is characterised by anti-communism,
anti-secularism and anti-Indianism; that is, characteristics which are
shared by the official circles." In this ideological vacuum the plank of
Islamisation had no rivals and religious intolerance no check whatever.
It is vain to hark back to Jinnah's famous secular pronoucement on August
11, 1947 in Pakistan's Constituent Assembly. By then he himself had done
damage enough by the poisonous two-nation theory. As an eminent
constitutional lawyer, Makhdoom Ali Khan, aptly summed up: "The rot didn't
start with the 1973 Constitution. Nor did it start when we declared the
Quadianis non-Muslims. It started when we demanded a state based on
religion." Fair warning to champions of Hindutva.
-- Frontline, April 7,1995
