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Pakistan Supports Terrorists Rebels in Kashmir: Congressional Speech
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - June 22, 1994
Copy of Pages E1295 and E1296
Pakistan Supports Terrorists Rebels in Kashmir
---------------------
HON. BILL McCOLLUM
of Florida
in the House of Representatives
Wednesday, June 22, 1994
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to bring to the
attention of the House a very important matter. The role of
Pakistan in aiding and abetting terrorism in Kashmir is well
documented, so much so that the administration almost placed the
Pakistani regime on the 1993 list of state sponsors of terrorism.
However, the administration did not take such action because it was
assured by Pakistan that Islamabad was taking credible steps to
disassociate itself from the militants in Kashmir.
Recent reports however, suggest that Pakistan never stopped
its aid to the terrorists in Kashmir. A report in the Washington
Post dated, May 16, 1994, titled, "Pakistan Aiding Rebels in
Kashmir: Muslims Reportedly Armed and Trained," by John Ward
Anderson, datelined Muzzabarabad, gives a first-hand account of
such assistance by Pakistan to terrorists in Kashmir.
The State Department has also confirmed this fact in its
annual report titled, Patterns of Global Terrorism" I quote,
"...there were credible reports in 1993 of official Pakistani
support to Kashmiri militants ..."
This fact is further confirmed from a study conducted by The
Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare titled, "The
Kashmir Connection," which I would like to place on the RECORD,
immediately following these remarks which details the Pakistani
involvement in aiding the terrorism in Kashmir.
This house should take cognizance of this serious issue
particularly as some of those who have been indicted in the bombing
of the World Trade Center had also received training in Pakistan.
THE KASHMIR CONNECTION
[By Yosef Bodansky and Vaughan S. Forrest]
Chief of Staff note: The following paper was prepared in light
of the publication in the Monday, May 16 issue of The Washington
Post of an article discussing Pakistan's extensive involvement in
rendering support to terrorist elements in Kashmir. That piece
revealed the fact of Pakistani involvement, but not the extent. In
this paper, and future papers, the Task Force will seek to explore
in-depth Pakistani role in international terrorism and its profound
ramifications for the Central Asian region in general, and India in
particular.
As the rivalry between India and Pakistan has intensified,
perhaps no other region has taken on the significance of Kashmir.
That province is unique among all the crisis points along the Indo-
Pakistani border in that it is not just an area of strategic and
economic importance, it is also the object of the ideological
passions of the various states in the region. Thus, the following
paper will briefly summarize the ongoing rivalry in Kashmir,
focussing on Pakistan, Iran, the various Islamist movements, and
the military/terrorist dimension of the conflict.
For Islamabad, the liberation of Kashmir is a sacred mission,
the only task unfulfilled since the days of the Pakistan's founder,
Muhammad Ali Jinah. However, Kashmir is equally important in that
it serves the domestic interests of the Pakistani government in in
three crucial respects. First, tension over Kashmir creates a
division from frustration at home. Second, the Kashmir cause allowes
Islamabad to rally the support of Pakistan's Islamist parties and
their loyalists in the military and the ISI, and third, it serves
the regime as an important access point to the markets of Central
Asia.
Similarity, Iran considers an escalation of the Jihad for the
liberation of Kashmir a key to the assertion of its own strategic
importance, particularly under the auspices of its own Islamic
block. Indeed, Iran sees Kashmir, because it is the land of the
Ayatollah Khomeni's roots, as sacred ground and is using that fact
to instill ideological zeal in the various nationals who make up
Tehrn's terrorist infrastructure. Not surprisingly, having taken
the proverbial tiger by the tail and invested such prestige in the
"Islamization" of Kashmir, Tehran now finds itself committed to
fighting for it.
Additionally, beyond Iran and Pakistan, the Armed Islamic
Movement, as well as several Saudi, Gulf Arab, and other supporters
of Islamist causes, put Kashmir high on their list of jihads to be
fought. This is not only because of Kashmir's aforementioned
material and "spiritual" importance, but also because it is seen as
a relatively easy target. Being geographically isolated and chocked
full of weapons and terrorist cells, many Islamist groups believe
that the wrestling of Kashmir from India would be a great prize at
minimal cost and would inspire their followers and further the cause.
Whatever the validity of such an assumption, all of the states
and organizations engaged in Kashmir have large, highly trained and
well equipped forces, and most have not been committed to Kashmiri
jihad yet. Thus, there exists an environment in which ideological
zeal and strategic and political considerations have coalesced.
Specifically, as already noted, Pakistan needs Kashmir as a
distraction from its domestic problems. Various "Afghan" groups are
chomping at the bits to move, awaiting only a wink and a nod from
ISI, and Iran and various Arab states stand willing to finance the
effort.
Thus, it is safe to assume that fighting in Kashmir will
escalate significantly, with numerous additional highly trained and
well equipped mujahadeen, many of them professional special forces
and terrorists, joining the fight and expanding the struggle into
the rest of India. Indeed, they are already in place extensive
stockpiles of weapons as well as large sums of money to sustain and
support such a conflict.
Consequently, apparently reassured about the steadfastness of
its Islamist support, Islamabad has acknowledged openly the
futility of its negotiations with India over the Kashmir issue. At
the same time, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has begun to
accede to demands from her military leaders for further increases
in the Pakistani defense budget.
THE TERRORIST DIMENSION
In fact, the rising militancy of Pakistani officials is far
from empty rhetoric, for Islamabad has used the increasing tension
in Kashmir as pretext for expanding its terrorist training and
support system for operations in Central Asia and elsewhere in the
world.
To that end, the ISI has established the Markaz-Dawar, a
center for worldwide Islamist activities. Mulavi Zaki, the center's
spiritual leader, has told the trainees that their destiny is to
fight and liberate "the land of Allaha from infidels wherever they
might be. The commanders and instructors at Markaz-Dawar are AIM
members, primarily Ikhwan from Algeria, Sudan and Egypt, and most
of them have more than a decade of combat experience in
Afghanistan.
In early 1992, some of these Afghans were transferred to Azad
Kashmir where new camps were being built for them by the Pakistani
Army. By early 1993, there were over 1000 "afghan" mujahdeen in the
Markaz-Dawar alone. Following the completion of their advanced
training, the Afghans were sent to Kashmir, Algeria and Egypt.
Furthermore, Islamabad's claim to the contrary notwithstanding, the
main offices of the Islamist terrorist organizations have remained
functioning in Peshawar.
In addition to the transfer noted above, a series of "raids"
by police since October 1992 resulted in the shifting of some 200
terrorist operatives , included some wanted by Western police
officials, to facilities near Jalalabad, just across the Afghan
border. Indeed, in the fall of 1993, an Arab Afghan with first hand
knowledge of the situation confirmed that Pakistan had "pushed them
out of the door only to open a window for them to return and they
come and go as they wish in Peshawar."
In the meantime, in the summer of 1993, the ISI had in the
Markaz-Dawar another force of some 200 Afghans - mainly Jallaludin
Haqqani's people from the Khowst area - operating under its direct
command and earmarked for special operations in Kashmir. According
to Mohammad Fazal al-Haji, a PFLF (Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine) terrorist captured in southern Kashmir in the summer
of 1993, additional "Afghans" and Afghan nationals were being
prepared by the ISI for a forthcoming escalation in Kashmir. At
least 400 "afghans" and Afghan nationals were known to have been
organized in one camp, where they were trained by the ISI to
augment and provide a leadership core for the Kashmiri Hizb-ul-
Mujahdeen. There was also a corresponding expansion of the
preparation of Islamist terrorists for operations in forward bases
in Kashmir, with some 600 terrorists, about half of them veteran
"afghans" and Afghans, already at the final phase of their
training.
Indeed, many Arab volunteers continue to arrive in Peshawar
almost every day. The preferred port of entry is the Karachi
airport. There a special department run by a Major Amir - an ISI
Major with Afghan experience "turned" director of Immigration at
the airport - oversees the volunteer's "proper" entry into Pakistan
and quick dispatch to Peshawar. The main Ikhwan facility is the
Maktaba-a-Khidmat (Services Offices), which was originally
established by the late Shaykh Abd Allah Azzam and is now run by
his successor, Shaykh Mohammad Yousaf Abbas. The Maktaba-i-Khidmat
still processes volunteers for AIM, but at present many of the
volunteers are dispatched to the numerous training camps run by the
Arab "Afghan" militants inside Afghanistan. The ISI continues to
provide the weapons and experience necessary to support this
operation.
Meanwhile, the government of Pakistan has also increased its
support for terrorist training and preparation. This growing direct
investment is important because the man operating bases for the
ISI's activities in Central Asia are in northern Afghanistan. The
origins of this arrangement run back to the aftermath of the fall
of Kabul. At that time, many Arab "Afghans" returned to Peshawar
where they were organized by the Pakistani government to support
various Islamist causes in concert with Iran and Sudan. Many of
these fighters later returned to Afghanistan as quality forces or
to serve as personal guard details.
Subsequently, in early December 1993, during a state visit to
Pakistan, Maulana Araslan Rahmani, elaborated on Kabul's perception
of the Islamist struggle worldwide, and especially in Central and
South Asia. He hailed Afghanistan's active support for Islamist
armed causes and stressed that "we don't consider this support as
intervention in any country's internal affairs." Maulana Araslan
Rehmani also admitted that Afghanistan was providing military
assistance to various insurgencies because "we cannot remain aloof
from what is happening to the Muslims in occupied Kashmir,
Tajikistan, Bosnia, Somalia, Burma, Palestine and elsewhere ... We
are not terrorists but Mujahdeen fighting for resorting peace and
preserving honor .."
Rehmani acknowledged that Afghanistan has played a major role
in a recent development among the Islamist organizations fighting
in Indian Kashmir, namely the merger of the Harakat ul-jihad Islami
and Harakat ul-Mujahdeen into the potent Harkat ul-Ansar group.
This support for the unification of the two movements , according
to Rehmani, was but part of the active support given by Afghanistan
to the Islamist fighters in Kashmir, Tajikstan, and Bosnia. "There
are about 8,000 members of Harkat ul-Ansar who are supporting the
Kashmiri struggle against Indian occupation," Rehmani stated.
OF MEN AND ARMS
The ISI also provides these and other terrorists with new
weapons. For example, in the summer of 1993, the Kashmiri Mujahdeen
were provide with powerful long-range missiles - called "chemical
missiles" by the Sikhs who had learned about them while in training
in Pakistan. At that time, the Kashmiri and ISI crews were being
trained in the use of these missiles in Pakistani Kashmir. In fact,
these are "saqr" missiles which were developed in the 1980 with
help from the United States for use by the mujahdeen in
Afghanistan.
Subsequently, there has been a significant expansion in the
smuggling of quality weapons from Pakistan into Kashmir and as of
late 1993 there has been a corresponding change in the tactics used
by the terrorists, including the use of hit and run strikes by
highly trained and well-equipped detachments. Among the new weapons
now used in Kashmir are 107mm rockets, 60mm mortars, 40mm automatic
grenade launchers (Soviet and Chinese models), a modification of
the 57mm helicopter rocket pods with solar-powered timing devices
for the deelayed firing of rockets and a LAW-type tube-launched
ATMs (Soviet and Chinese models).
In addition, the Kashmiri terrorists have also begun using
sophisticated communication systems including small radios (systems
with frequency hopping , selective broadcast, digital burst
communications, etc.) and collapsible solar-systems for reload
systems, as well as frequency scanning devices for detecting and
homing in on military-type broadcast. All the communication systems
are of NATO/US origin, with some components made in Japan. All of
these systems have been used by the Mujahdeen in Afghanistan,
having been provided via the ISI.
On top of all this, there has been a large increase in the
quantities of small arms provided to the Kashmiris, including Type
56 ARs (PRC AK-47s), several types of machine-guns, long-range
sniper rifles, pistols and RPGs, all of Soviet or Chinese
manufacture. Also, some of the Kashmiri terrorists have begun
receiving highly specialized weapons for assassination projects.
Given this obviously high level of sophistication, it would
seem safe to assume that the situation in Kashmir will become
increasingly ominous. As Pakistan and India eye each other with
suspicion, and as other powers come into play, the danger of
outright war becomes ever more real. In future reports, the Task
Force will examine the full extent of this danger and will explain
its ramifications.
