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Re: Dvaita and Advaita: A Reconciliation
On Fri, 16 Jun 1995, anand hudli <ahudli@silver.ucs.indiana.edu> wrote:
> I am using the term Dvaita here following scholars such as Dr. BNK
Sharma,
> who does not find any negative connotation with it; he does suggest an
> alternative -- svatantra-advitIya-brahmavAda. But then he defends the
> usage of "Dvaita", because Vyasatirtha himself uses it to desrcibe his
> Guru, SrIpAdarAya as "dvaita-kula-tilaka."
Let's be clear; I do not find any "negative connotation" either. I just
find it off-target, and inadequately descriptive. And while I hold Dr.
Sharma in high regard, I am not inclined to seriously take his suggestion
for such nonstandard nomenclature, unless it has the support of someone
much higher than him.
Addressing Sriipaadaraaya as "Dvaita-kula-tilaka" does not prove that
"Dvaita" was intended by Sri Vyaasa Tiirtha as a name for the _doctrine_;
if so, then we could also call it Likucha, because Trivikrama Pandita was
called "Likucha-tilaka." On the other hand, we have the following verse,
from Sri Vaadiraaja Tiirtha's Yukti-Mallikaa:
Tat-puurva-sarva-raaddhaanta siddhaarthaanam nisheddhari
pare cha Tatvavaade'smin gariiyasi bharo mama
tat paratvaat nishedhrtvaat ante siddhehe Prabhu-stute
ante siddhastu siddhaanto Madhvasya-aagama eva hi
The definition "ante siddhastu siddhaanto" is beautifully clear, and it
is clear that Sri Vaadiraaja Tiirtha prefers 'Tatvavaada' over any other
word, to describe the doctrine he finds right.
> I know the five differences are eternal according to Dvaita, but I
> accept this as one of the irreconcilable points between the two
> systems. First of all, I did point out in the beginning of the post
> that Advaita will reconcile with other systems to the extent that they
> do not violate its own basic tenets. So the job I am trying to do here
> is to reconcile as much as possible and not worry about the
> irreconcilable issues.
It seems to me that almost all significant Advaita tenets are rejected at
the outset, by Tatvavaada, which does not honor, for example, the notions
of abhedaagama, Mahaavaakya, Maayaa (in the Advaita sense), avidyaa,
Nirguna Brahman, and vyaavahaarikatva. Therefore, any reconcilable issues
left are inadequate to describe Advaita meaningfully, which is why
reconciliation of the type you attempt is not meaningful.
>
> Advaita accepts
> that to those who meditate on the saguNa Brahman, the nirguNa Brahman
> manifests itself. Further, the saguNa Brahman is not in any way
> inferior to the NirguNa Brahman, at least according to Sankara.
If Advaita does so accept, then this would be a bone of contention,
rather than a point of agreement, and in any event, does not justify the
use of 'Hari' for the nirguna Brahman.
> Now, the saguNa Brahman Himself is not tainted by the three gunas,
> although He may have infinite number of transcendental attributes,
>
> asankhyeyakalyANaguNAkAram sakaladoShagandhavidhuram.
>
> He is full of an infinite number of auspicious attributes, but free
> from all imperfections.
True; He is "nirdoshaa'sheshasadgunam."
>
> I agree there is a difference between nirguNa and saguNa brahman, but
> there is no question of who is the superior of the two. They are one
> and the same. Hari is easily recognized to be the saguNa brahman. He
is
This is a patent contradiction. You agree that there is a difference, and
in the same paragraph, say that they are one and the same. It is worth
your while to decide which *one* of these mutually incompatible positions
you want to hold.
> also the nirguNa brahman. For example, says Sankara's Hari stuti (37):
>
> sattAmAtram kevalavijnAnamajam sat
> sUkShmam nityam tattvamasItyAtmasutAya
> sAmnAmante prAha pitA yam vibhumAdyam
> tam samsAradhvAntavinASam harimIDe || 37 ||
>
> In the Chandogya Upanishad, the father Uddalaka told his son
> Svetaketu, "tat tvam asi", "you are Brahman." This (Brahman)
> is sattAmAtram, pure existence , kevala-vijnAnam, pure consciousness,
> sUkshmam, beyond the reach of the senses, sat, real, nityam,
> eternal and It is (none other than) Hari, the destroyer of the
> darkness that is this empirical existence.
>
When I do not agree with Shankara's interpretation of the Chaandogya, I
would hardly take the above very seriously. In any event, the
Chaandogya's 'tat' refers to the Saguna, rather than the nirguna,
Brahman, so Shankara does not support your view in this verse.
> It is seen here that Hari is identified with the Brahman of the
> Upanishads.
>
In a Tatvavaada sense, perfectly so; in an Advaita sense, only with the
Saguna Brahman, not with the nirguna.
> >I think saying that Iishvara is Brahman "with the limiting adjunct
mAyA"
> >definitely introduces a circularity into the argument, as you say
later
> >that "He controls it and is not controlled by it." If he is not
> >controlled by it, how is it a "limiting adjunct"?
>
> Brahman is the One that is limited by mAyA and becomes ISvara. I don't
> see any circularity here.
>
Perhaps I can help. If He is actually the nirguna Brahman under Maayaa,
and is also the controller of the same Maayaa, then:
Hari = nirguna Brahman + Maayaa
but
Maayaa <--> Hari
(Maayaa is present if and only if Hari is)
therefore
Hari = nirguna Brahman + Hari
or
nirguna Brahman = null
and
Maayaa = Hari
I apologize for the crude symbolism, but I think the meaning should be
clear. Hari, or the Saguna Brahman, is actually the nirguna, under
Maayaa; however, the latter, Maayaa, is an action of Hari. Therefore,
Hari is an action of Himself on the nirguna, which in turn implies that
the nirguna does not exist, and that Hari's action is He himself (which
is quite acceptable -- "guna-kriyaadayoho Vishnoho svaruupam na anyad
ishyate").
This very same argument, presented vastly better, is given by Sri
Jayatiirtha.
> >If, on the other hand, it is claimed that it is the nirguna Brahman,
with
> >the limiting adjunct, that becomes the Paramaatman, and that the
> >Paramaatman has no flaw as a consequence, then there are two problems:
> >
> >1> Something, namely the nirguna Brahman, picks up a flaw, namely the
> >limiting adjunct, and becomes something flawless, namely the
Paramaatman.
> >Does it make sense for something to pick up a flaw and thus become
> >flawless? No -- this would be preposterous.
> >
> >2> There are two entities, namely, the limiting adjunct or the flaw,
and
> >Brahman, or the entity that acquires the flaw. The flaw cannot be the
> >same as Brahman -- then the flaw would be Brahman's self-same nature,
and
> >Iishvara, rather than the nirguna Brahman, becomes the Paaramaarthika
> >satya. Also, the nirguna Brahman, being characterized by this
> >characteristic, would no longer remain nirguna. However, on accepting
> >these two entities, abheda is lost.
>
> >From the standpoint of nirguNa brahman, this conversion into ISvara,
the
> creation and control of the world, the jivas who are controlled by It,
> etc. are all unreal. If you think the nirguNa brahman picks up a flaw,
> we say this act does not take place! It is the nirguNa brahman that
> exists as the One and Only Reality. All other entities don't exist.
> Thus limiting of nirguNa brahman, etc., are only apparently real.
Won't wash! As has been pointed out by Tatvavaada scholars like Sri
Jayatiirtha, the vyaavahaarikatva of the Saguna Brahman itself has be a
Paaramaarthika satya; otherwise, if it is itself vyaavahaarika, then it
is not true, and will lapse, meaning that the Saguna Himself becomes a
Paaramaarthika satya. In the standard example of the rope-snake illusion,
the false perception of the snake is itself true; after the illusion
lapses, the man cannot deny that his perception of the snake itself was
false.
And your saying "this act does not take place" gives rise to another
problem; you first claim that the nirguna does pick up a flaw, and then
you say this does not take place. This is like saying that there is no
food, but still someone is having a meal.
> >There is one difference, tho. Srimad Ananda Tiirtha also says
> >"padaarthasvaruupaat bhedasya," meaning that bheda, or difference, is
the
> >svaruupa, or self-same nature, of a padaartha, or entity. Thus,
according
> >to him, not only are the three kinds of entities Iishvara, jiiva and
jada
> >separately real, their differences are also their self-same natures.
The
> >padaartha-svaruupatva of bheda is irreconcilable with the
> >vyaavahaarikatva of bheda claimed by Advaita -- the svaruupa according
to
> >Ananda Tiirtha is a Paaramaarthika satya; something that is added on,
or
> >lost, changed, modified, etc., cannot be the self-same nature.
>
> You are right again. If Ananda tirtha says something other than
> brahman is also a pAramArthika satya, that is irreconcilable. But
> as I said earlier, I am not trying to reconcile each and every detail
> of Dvaita with Advaita.
Actually, this is a core issue, not a detail. In fact, there may be some
fringe detail that can be reconciled, but the core issues cannot be.
>
>
> >Upon which, the Tatvavaadi will probably point to statements like
"Satya
> >Aatmaa, satyo jiivaha, satyam bhidaa satyam bhidaa satyam bhidaa,"
etc.,
> >which speak of eternal difference.
>
> This is probably a subject of another discussion and I will leave it
> alone here.
Whatever you say.
> Yes, in the Brahmaloka where the jivas obtain the so-called "mukti"
> and enjoy bliss, they retain their individuality as jivas, but
> once they merge in the nirguNa brahman, all such activity ceases.
> The One Brahman or Self enjoys Itself with Itself. There is no
> enjoyment which includes a subject-object relationship.
>
As I pointed out before, *Brahmaloka* is the abode of the chatur-mukha
Brahma, and is visited *only* by amuktas, who return. Your saying that
the mukta goes to Brahmaloka is contrary to scripture, for instance, to
the Bhagavad Gita (VIII-16):
Aabrahmabhuvanaallokaaha punaraavartino'rjuna
Maam-upetya tu Kaunteya punarjanma na vidyate
Second, there is no scriptural evidence to indicate that a mukta is
further dissolved into a nirguna Brahman, and your ad hoc hypothesis to
that effect is not worthy of consideration.
>
> >Therefore, the Brhadaaranyaka says, the Tatvavaadi would continue,
that
> >if a jiiva is in mukti and supported fully by the Lord
("Aatmaivaabhuut")
> >then it has no need for any jagat-vyaapaara, and thus, "kena pashyet,
> >kena jighret, kena vijaaniiyaat," etc.
>
> Your interpretation of "AtmaivAbut" as "supported fully by the Lord"
> is totally beyond my comprehension.
All right, then. So we'll try another explanation, and hope you can get
this one.
Consider the following two verses from the Bhagavad Gita (V-8,9):
Naiva kinchit karomi iti yukto manyeta tatvavit
pashyanshrnvan sprshan jighran ashnan gachchhan svapan shvasan
pralapan visrjan grnhan unmishannimishannapi
indriyaani indriyaartheshu vartante iti dhaarayan
A "tatvavit" thinks he does nothing at all, "naiva kinchit karomi, iti,"
-- that he does not see (pashyan), hear (shrnvan), touch (sprshan), etc.
Now, this when correlated to the Brhadaaranyaka, gives us another
meaning, that when a person assumes to act independently of the Lord,
"yatra tu dvaitam iva bhavati," then he acts, and when "sarvam tu Aatmaa
iva aabhuut," or sees the Lord as being behind everything, then he is a
'tatvavit,' to use Krishna's term, and does not.
This gives a very sensible, and quite non-Advaita, meaning again. This
meaning has been given by Sri Vaadiraaja Tiirtha in his Yukti-Mallikaa,
tho I again I must stress that he does a vastly better job.
Some points that need to be made:
1> 'Aatmaa' is never interpreted to mean the nirguna Brahman, even by
scholars of Advaita; as in the Kathopanishad's "Naivam Aatmaa
pravachanena labhyo..." (the Lord is not obtainable thru discourse...),
etc., it is always used to mean the Paramaatman, *only*.
2> The "yatra tu sarvam Aatmaivaabhuut" cannot be assumed to be true,
without assuming that "sarvam," which it speaks of as "Aatmaivaabhuut,"
(whatever that may mean) is true as well. However, an Advaita
interpretation cannot admit the truth of "sarvam," as this verse is then
interpreted in support of the condition of Advaita-siddhi, where no
"sarvam" exists.
3> "Aabhuut" does mean something like "taken over by," or "abided by"; of
this there is no question.
In summation, therefore, whether or not you consider the explanation(s)
given to be correct, there is no doubt that the Brhadaaranyaka statement
is not a clear statement of abheda; it is in fact less so than the ones
chosen by Shankara as Mahaavaakyas, and less even than non-Mahaavaakyas
like "prapancho yadi vidyeta, nivarteta na samshayaha; maayaamaatram idam
dvaitam, advaitam paramaarthataha" -- in fact, if I were in your shoes, I
would have tried to use this last instead of the Brhadaaranyaka quote,
and if I were forgiven the impertinence of the suggestion, I would ask
Shankara to ditch the not-too-useful "tattvamasi" and use this as a
Mahaavaakya, or at least, to have five instead of four, incl. this one.
>
> >If "jiivaganaaha Harehe anucharaaha" is to be given an Advaita
> >interpretation, then, the Brahman with the limitation of the
collective
> >Maayaa would be the controller of the Brahman with the individual
Maayaa.
> >However, this is akin to saying that someone who has all the diseases
in
> >the world is better off than one who has just one of the world's
> >diseases, and is ludicrous as a consequence.
>
> It is not. ISvara knows that He is none other than Brahman; a jiva
> does not know thus. ISvara is the controller of mAyA, despite the
> fact that He is Brahman limited by the collective mAyA. He is affected
> by mAyA in the sense that He is filled with pure sattva guNa only.
There
> are no blemishes in Him.
>
Recall that earlier on, you said, and I quote: "Now, the saguNa Brahman
Himself is not tainted by the three gunas, although He may have infinite
number of transcendental attributes,
asankhyeyakalyANaguNAkAram sakaladoShagandhavidhuram."
Therefore, to say that He is "filled with pure satva guna only" is even
more ludicrous than the position you were trying to avoid.
> >is obvious: "Na hi aham sarvagnyaha, sarveshvaro, nirduhkho, nirdosha
> >iti vaa kasyachit anubhavaha; asti cha tat viparyayena anubhavaha." We
> >do not experience 'I am all-knowing, the Lord of all, without pain,
> >without flaw'; the opposite of this is the experience. And while the
> >jiiva experiences a small portion of its naija-sukha during sleep, it
> >does not experience any of the Lord's characteristics during sleep.
>
> If ordinary experience were the best judge, then we would all be
> under the belief that the sun revolves around the earth! Just as
> we need scientific insight to correct this ordinary experience,
> we need spiritual insight to show that Brahman is all there is.
Sorry, won't wash, again. Even the proper understanding of heliocentrism
does not negate the apparent motion of the Sun around the Earth; the
experience of such is quite right, but if the Sun is concluded to be
revolving around the Earth, based on it, then that conclusion is false.
So also, Advaita cannot negate our experiences, because its own sources
depend on it; what it can do is to show that we have derived incorrect
inferences from such experience, and can show us what the correct ones
are.
> No. Brahman is bliss, bliss and bliss, and nothing else. Why would a
> jiva protest the promotion to this state?
> Anando brahmeti vyajAnAt, he (bhRgu) knew Bliss as Brahman.
> (Tai. U. 3.6.1)
Actually, this quote has to be referring to the Saguna, rather than to
the nirguna, Brahman, because it refers to a specific quality, Ananda,
that the nirguna cannot possess. And it is certainly not the case that
the jiiva is promoted to the Saguna Brahman.
> >In any event, should you say that Advaita recognizes six sources of
> >knowledge rather than three, this is an irreconcilable difference --
> >Madhva says "arthaapattyupame anumaa visheshaha," or arthaapatti and
>
> Irreconcilable if you try to capture Advaitic methods of knowledge
> within Dvaita's. In the converse direction there is reconciliation.
>
Apparently, you and I have very different ideas of reconciliation means;
I do not see it as being directional in nature -- either there is
reconciliation or there is not. No question of there being reconciliation
in one direction but not in the other.
> I think Vidyasankar posted a clarification of arthApatti, anupalabdhi
> and upamAna, so I won't repeat it here.
>
Well, no, not really. What he did try was to say that arthaapatti is
different from anumaana, and that anupalabdhi is different from abhaava;
even after his posting, neither such is known beyond dispute, and in any
event, are not really a help in reconciliation, since they can only mean
that a given individual or more than one, is given the conviction that
Advaita's position is right, which does not bring the said position any
closer to Tatvavaada's.
>
> >Perhaps the flavor of the above paragraph is slightly below the belt;
in
> >any event, this sounds like a little case of sour grapes to me --
Advaita
> >does not hesitate to use logic when it thinks it can get away with it
--
> >the complaints pour in only when its cards are trumped.
>
> I am sorry if that sounded as below the belt. As regards Advaita's
cards
> being trumped, that did not happen. Vyasatirtha did a superb job in
> criticizing Advaita in his Nyayamrta, but all his objections were
> ably met by Madhusudana Sarasvati in his Advaita siddhi. Besides,
attacking
> Advaita from a logical point of view is nothing new; logicians and
> Buddhists had done it before, and failed.
>
I'm not aware that Madhusuudana Saraswati has been able to meet any of
Vyaasa Tiirtha's objections (which, incidentally, are spread thru the
Vyaasa-traya -- the Nyaayaamrta, the Tarka-taandava, and the
'Chandrikaa). Another book of very high significance is Vaadiraaja
Tiirtha's Yukti-Mallikaa.
If logicians and Buddhists have been unable to refute Advaita on logical
grounds before, then that is a significant indicator of their lack of
performance, when compared to Tatvavaada's, whose objections to
considering some statements as Mahaavaakyas, to considering the alleged
abheda-Shrutis as to be preferred over others, and to the upajiiva
virodha in the former two and elsewhere, have never been answered, by
Madhusuudana Saraswati or anyone else.
> >Logic may *not* be discarded, and in any case,
> >the flavor of the last few lines is quite non-conciliatory; I take it
you
> >give that up as impossible?
>
> Advaita too does not say that one must accept all its doctrines
> with blind faith. In fact, it encourages logical thought in one of the
> three steps to Brahman realization, ie. manana, the other two being
> SravaNa and nididhyAsana. However, logic must be guided by Sruti
> as far as spiritual matters are concerned. The important difference
> between the two schools lies in what they consider to be "scripture."
> For example, SmRti plays a subordinate role to Sruti in Advaita, but
> not so in Dvaita. Madhva quotes from a wide variety of Puranas,
> PancarAtras, and other non-Sruti literature, apart from the standard
> Sruti texts, in his commentaries.
>
I'm not aware that SrimadAachaarya has quoted from the Pancha-raatra or
the Muula-Raamaayana anywhere; if you know of a specific quote, I would
welcome the reference. Advaita does not accept all Shruti as scripture,
in addition, preferring to arbitrarily brand some inconvenient ones as
"atatvaavedaka" and "anuvaadaka," so its own record in this matter is
highly questionable.
>
> >condemn opponents' offer to use logic. Does that not amount to a
> >flight from reason? Why else would you rather condemn your opponents'
> >motives and ability in applying logic, than find the truth?
>
> Vidyaranya is not condemning logic per se here. All he says is that
one
> must give up kutarka, faulty logic.
>
Fault, be it in logic, or anything else, is known only by showing a
dosha, or specific instance of flaw. That being the case, a general
condemnation of kutarka is not useful; better to devote one's time to
showing why a tarka not accepted is a kutarka.
>
> >Oh, plenty. For starters, take the upajiivya virodha! His saying that
> >he does not explain "merely" from a logical standpoint amounts to a
> >tacit admission that his explanations are sometimes illogical.
>
> For a person who thinks the sun revolves around the earth, an
> explanation of the converse fact may seem illogical, because it is,
> after all, not in accordance with "ordinary experience."
>
Not really; I fully accept the facts of my own experience of the sun's
rising, setting, and apparent motion, but have no difficulty in accepting
heliocentrism. And in this regard, I am no different from a zillion
others who have been thru high school.
>
>
> >>
> >> The great teachers of Vedanta have always felt the need to
> >> reconcile differing views with their own. In fact, the first
> >> chapter of Brahma Sutras is called samanvaya adhyAya or the
> >> chapter of reconciliation. Let us follow this example so that
> >> we will be spiritually enriched by different schools of Vedanta.
> >
> >I am not sure who exactly the "great teachers of Vedanta" are supposed
to
> >be, but Madhva, who may not be one in your view, is firmly set against
> >the all-roads-lead-to-Rome approach, and takes the time to
unforgivingly
> >denounce all contrary hypotheses; his statement "mithyaagnyaanena cha
> >tamo" is also quite clear in this respect.
>
> The Gita and the Bhagavata have laid down three paths to Moksha --
> jnAna, bhakti and karma. There are "three roads to Rome."
>
Ah, so we are at a loss, what? Not quite -- for one thing, according to
your position, Advaita must be supported by Shruti only, rather than by
its adjuncts. Second, it is better to say that the 'Gita shows *two*
paths, saankhya-yoga and karma-yoga, with gnyaana and bhakti being
required, and as Krishna says "ekam saankhyam cha yogam cha yaha pashyati
sa pashyati."
Regards,
Shrisha Rao
> >[*chomp*]
>
>
> >Shrisha Rao
>
>
> Anand
>
>
