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Re: Dvaita and Advaita: A Reconciliation



anand hudli <ahudli@silver.ucs.indiana.edu> wrote:

[*chomp*]

>  unenviable, to say the least. At the risk of being criticized
>  by both sides, especially by  Dvaitins who may find my attempt
>  to bring Dvaita into the Advaitic fold obnoxious, I will make
>  an attempt to show that what the Dvaitins talk about fits nicely
>  within the framework of Advaita. Of course, criticisms from both
>  sides are welcome!
> 

At the outset, I point out that the mislabeling of Tatvavaada as Dvaita, 
tho carried to a great finesse in many works in the past, is actually a 
barrier, because such usage tends to emphasize the differences between it 
and Advaita, while de-emphasizing the points there are in common.

Speaking for myself, I do not see why anyone would see a consistent 
treatment of Vedanta that attempts to integrate the two schools as 
obnoxious; however, an inconsistent treatment might well be so.

[*chomp*]

>  On first examination, it is natural for anyone to think of the two
>  philosophies, Dvaita and Advaita, as diametrically opposed to each
>  other. The obvious difference is that Jiva and God are held to be
>  eternally different by the Dvaitins, while the Advaitins believe
>  that Jiva is identical with Brahman and the realization of this
>  identity is the ultimate experience. A second obvious difference
>  is that the Dvaitins, as do other Vaisnava schools, vehemently deny
>  the mithyAtva or the illusory nature of the world, and insist that
>  the world is real.

According to Tatvavaada, all *five* differences are held to be eternally 
true, not just one of them.

> 
>  Let us look at the main tenets of Dvaita and consider them one by one.
>  An often quoted verse capturing the philosophy of Madhva is:
> 
>   SrIman madhvamate harih paratarah satyam jagat tattvato
>   bhedah jIvagaNA hareranucarA nIcoccabhAvam gatAh  |
>   muktir naijasukhAnubhUtir amalA bhaktih tatsAdhanam
>   hyakshAdi tritayam pramANam akhilAmnAyaikavedyo harih ||
> 
>  1) harih paratarah| Hari is the Supreme Lord and there is none
>     superior to Hari. Hari is the One and Only Independent Reality.
> 
>   There are two possible Advaitic interpretations here. a) Hari is the
>  Brahman described in Vedanta. Brahman is the One and Only Reality.

I am not aware of any Advaita scholar ever interpreting 'Hari' to mean 
the nirguna Brahman; Hari specifically describes a quality: "yaha harati 
sa Harihi," or one who takes away (the bondage of a jiiva, etc.) is Hari. 
Thus, Hari is not the nirguna Brahman -- the latter is not described as 
having such a quality (obviously), and is also not called Hari by any 
Advaita scholar.

>  sarvam khalvidam brahma, says the Chandogya Upanishad. When everything
>  is Brahman, the question of superior and inferior reality does not
>  arise. Thus, saying Brahman is the Supreme Lord or the Supreme Reality
>  does not go against Advaita.

Well, it does. Simply because while on a vyaavahaarika basis Advaita may 
accept such a tenet, it cannot say Hari is the Supreme. "Brahman is the 
Supreme Lord" does not go against Advaita, quite obviously, but one gets 
that far only on squaring the spurious identification of Hari with the 
nirguna Brahman. Second, if the question of superior and inferior does 
not arise, then "Harihi parataraha" becomes meaningless.

>  b) Some Advaitins may say that Hari is the Isvara and not the Nirguna
>    Brahman. Even in this case, Harih paratarah stands! The standard
>   position of Advaita regarding Isvara is as follows: while it is
>   possible for each Jiva to become one with Brahman, it is impossible
>  for a Jiva to become Isvara Himself. And who is Isvara? He is Brahman
>  with the limiting adjunct mAyA. He is the controller of mAyA and is
>   not controlled by it, as Jivas are.
>     mAyAm tu prakRtim vidyAn mAyinam tu maheSvaram. Furthermore, there
>  cannot be two or more Isvaras. Thereby it follows that Isvara is the
>  Supreme Ruler of the World and no Jiva can ever become ISvara.
>  (Please see point 6 below.)

I think saying that Iishvara is Brahman "with the limiting adjunct mAyA" 
definitely introduces a circularity into the argument, as you say later 
that "He controls it and is not controlled by it." If he is not 
controlled by it, how is it a "limiting adjunct"?

Even if Hari, the Paramaatman, has a limitation for whatever reason, then 
this is definitely a digression from Tatvavaada:

||   Sadaagamaika vigneyam samatiita ksharaaksharam      ||
||   Naaraayanam sadaa vande nirdosha ashesha sadgunam   ||
                             ~~~~~~~~ 

Also, the Naaradiiya says:
"Sarvagnyam sarva-kartaaram Naaraayanam anaamayam."  
                                        ~~~~~~~~~~

"Aamayapadam dosha-gnyaapanam," or "aamaya" is a reminder (signifier)
of flaw; one who is described as an-aamaya cannot have a flaw such as
a "limiting adjunct."

If, on the other hand, it is claimed that it is the nirguna Brahman, with 
the limiting adjunct, that becomes the Paramaatman, and that the 
Paramaatman has no flaw as a consequence, then there are two problems:

1> Something, namely the nirguna Brahman, picks up a flaw, namely the 
limiting adjunct, and becomes something flawless, namely the Paramaatman. 
Does it make sense for something to pick up a flaw and thus become 
flawless? No -- this would be preposterous.

2> There are two entities, namely, the limiting adjunct or the flaw, and 
Brahman, or the entity that acquires the flaw. The flaw cannot be the 
same as Brahman -- then the flaw would be Brahman's self-same nature, and 
Iishvara, rather than the nirguna Brahman, becomes the Paaramaarthika 
satya. Also, the nirguna Brahman, being characterized by this 
characteristic, would no longer remain nirguna. However, on accepting 
these two entities, abheda is lost.

[*chomp*]

> 2) satyam jagat| The world is real. Before we go further, it is
>  important to know what the Dvaitins mean by reality. Vyasatirtha,
>  one of the three luminaries of Dvaita, says in his magnum opus,
>   the Nyayamrta
>    trikAlasarvadeSIyaniShedhApratiyogitA sattocyate| meaning
>    "not being the counter correlate of negation with respect to ALL
>     three periods of time and space is reality." If something
>    exists in one of the three periods of time, past, present and
>   future, then it is regarded as real.

Slight change: if something exists in *at least* one of the three; it may 
exist in more than one.

> 
>   We Advaitins regard the world as vyavahArika satya. What does this
>  mean? As long as BrahmasAkShAtkAra or Brahman experience does not
>  take place, the world is real. Once the pAramArthika satya or Brahman
>  is experienced, the empirical world with all its diversity is seen as
>  unreal. It is in this sense that we say the world, jagat  is mithyA.
>  Thus what we call vyAvahArika satya
>  is satya to the Dvaitins. An Advaitin who is yet to experience
>  Brahman, and a Dvaitin can have no argument about the status of the
>  world. It is real! Even an Advaitin with Brahman experience must live
>  in the empirical world so long as his prArabdha karma is not 
exhausted,
>  and he may not have any quarrel with the Dvaitin. Further, from
>  viewpoint of Brahman too, the world is real. It is all Brahman!

There is one difference, tho. Srimad Ananda Tiirtha also says 
"padaarthasvaruupaat bhedasya," meaning that bheda, or difference, is the 
svaruupa, or self-same nature, of a padaartha, or entity. Thus, according 
to him, not only are the three kinds of entities Iishvara, jiiva and jada 
separately real, their differences are also their self-same natures. The 
padaartha-svaruupatva of bheda is irreconcilable with the 
vyaavahaarikatva of bheda claimed by Advaita -- the svaruupa according to 
Ananda Tiirtha is a Paaramaarthika satya; something that is added on, or 
lost, changed, modified, etc., cannot be the self-same nature.

>  For the logical minded Advaitin, who systematically reasons about the
>  world, of course, it is anirvacanIyA, indescribable, or in other words
>  confusing! If the Dvaitin argues that the world is eternally real, 
point
>  out to him the statement from BRhadAraNyaka upanishad:
>  yatra vA asya sarvamAtmaivAbhUt tatkena kam jighret tatkena
>  kam paSyet |

Upon which, the Tatvavaadi will probably point to statements like "Satya 
Aatmaa, satyo jiivaha, satyam bhidaa satyam bhidaa satyam bhidaa," etc., 
which speak of eternal difference.

On being pressed further to explain why the Brhadaaranyaka would
support abheda, then, he would say it doesn't, as did Srimad Ananda
Tiirtha -- "na cha abhede kaschid aagamaha; santi cha bhede
sarvaagamaaha." Shruti also describes the Paramaatman as "amrtasya
setuhu," or a support to all the mukta jiivas, and says
"Iishamaashritya tishthanti muktaaha samsaarasaagaraat.
Yatheshtabhogaa bhoktaaro Brahmaanta uttarottaram" -- the jiivas are
supported by the Lord after mukti, and get whatever they desire
directly from him, with no need for jagat-vyaapaara, or worldly
activity. That is why the Lord is also worshipped as: "Om
jagadvyaapaaravarjam Om."

Therefore, the Brhadaaranyaka says, the Tatvavaadi would continue, that 
if a jiiva is in mukti and supported fully by the Lord ("Aatmaivaabhuut") 
then it has no need for any jagat-vyaapaara, and thus, "kena pashyet, 
kena jighret, kena vijaaniiyaat," etc.

> 
>  Where for whom all this has become the AtmA, who smells whom and with
>  what? Who sees whom and with what?
> 
>  There cannot be two or more eternal realities as that would lead to
>  what philosophers call "hopeless dualism."

There cannot be just one eternal real according to anyone, or we would 
have to call one who holds such a view as a "hopeless philosopher"!

> 
> 3) tattvatah bhedah | Differences are real.
> 
>  Once we understand that the world is vyAvahArika satya, we agree that
>  all the diversity and differences we perceive are real in this
>  limited sense.
>  Separateness or difference is real. "nAbhAva upalabdheh" says
>  the Brahma Sutra (II.2.28). The things in the external world are
>  not nonexistent because of our perception and consciousness of them.
>  Since the world is real and we are aware of different things in the
>   world, differences are necessarily real.

"Tatvataha bhedaaha" means not just that differences are real, but also 
that differences are the self-same nature of an entity -- this latter 
part is hard to square with traditional Advaita.

I do not know the correct context where the Brahma Suutra says "na
abhaava upalabdhehe," but it is not clear why your interpretation
follows from that. In a bland sense, what it seems to convey is that
something, it is not clear what, is not proved or obtained ("na
upalabdhehe") in the absence of something else ("abhaava"). At this
point, it is worth noting that according to Ananda Tiirtha, our senses
can perceive entities, and they can also perceive the absence of the
entities whose presense they can perceive. The ears can hear sounds,
and they can also make out silence; the eyes can see light, and they
can also see darkness, etc.

> 
>    yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaram paSyati,
>    "Where there is duality (dvaita), there one sees another", says the
>     BRhadAraNyaka. Thus, while in the state of duality or the empirical
>    world, perceptual knowledge is real.
> 
>     This establishes that the world is not a purely imaginary thing
>    such as the horns of a hare.
> 

I can understand the above if there were some need to counter a total 
nihilist who claimed that the universe is wholly false, but why is it 
necessary with a Tatvavaadi, who is in any case going to insist that the 
universe is *not* false at all?

> 4) jIvagaNA hareranucarAh | The jivas are dependent or under the 
control
>    of Hari. Right on the dot, according to the Advaitins. All jivas are
>    under the control of  ISvara or Hari. By jIva, Advaitins mean 
Brahman
>   with the limiting adjunct of the individual mAyA or ajnAna or avidyA.
>   ISvara, however, is Brahman with the limiting adjunct of the 
collective
>   mAyA, samaShTi, and there is not even a trace of rajas and tamas in
>   Him.  ISvara is One but jivAs are many. But this precisely is what 
the
>   Dvaitins hold! bahavah puruShAh puruShapravaro harih, says Madhva.
>   Individual souls are many ; Hari is the supreme among sentient 
beings.
> 

If "jiivaganaaha Harehe anucharaaha" is to be given an Advaita 
interpretation, then, the Brahman with the limitation of the collective 
Maayaa would be the controller of the Brahman with the individual Maayaa. 
However, this is akin to saying that someone who has all the diseases in 
the world is better off than one who has just one of the world's 
diseases, and is ludicrous as a consequence.

> 5) nIcoccabhAvam gatAh |  There is gradation among the jivas. Some are
>   superior; some are inferior. The law of karma at work. Because of 
their
>   past karma, there are differences or gradations, tAratamya among 
jivas.
>   Again, no quarrel here.

Yes, there is. The "niichochcha bhaava" in Tatvavaada is not due to karma 
or karma-phala; it is inherent in the jiiva itself. 

> 
> 6) muktir naijasukhAnubhUtih | Moksha is the realization of innate
>    happiness of the self. Here, Dvaitins believe that the individual
>    soul active enjoys felicity even after it attains moksha. The soul
>    attains all its desires and enjoys bliss and pleasure. However, the
>    soul does not have the power of creation which belongs exclusively 
to
>    the Lord. Madhva does not hold that attaining Moksha is to be
>    avoided, unlike some of the other Vaisnava sects.

Madhva's position is not so much that the jiiva enjoys "even after" it 
attains moksha; it is that it is not enjoying much at all at present; 
that its pleasures are few, small, and short-lived, its pains many, 
large, and nearly continuous. The sukha of moksha is different because it 
is uninterrupted, without end, and not diluted by pain.

> 
>    In his commentary on Brahma Sutras (Ch. 4 Section 3), Sankara
>    BhagavatpAda says that the soul of one who knows the Saguna Brahman
>    or the Conditioned Brahman goes to Brahmaloka. The soul stays there
>    enjoying bliss and all divine powers except the power of creation
>    which belongs exclusively to ISvara. Sankara further interprets
>    Brahma sutra 4.4.8, sankalpAdeva tu tat Sruteh,  as saying that the
>    soul in Brahmaloka fulfills its desires by mere volition (sankalpa).
>    Sankara opines that the soul may exist with or without a body,
>    according to its liking (sutras 10-14). Madhva follows Sankara here.
> 

Brahmaloka is supposed to be the chatur-mukha Brahma's abode; even 
amuktas like Prahlaada have been there and back. The mukta goes to 
Vaikuntha, from where he does not return ("yat gatvaa na nivartante, 
tat-dhaama paramam mama" -- Krishna in the 'Gita).

In addition to this, there is another important difference. Recall
that according to Madhva, "muktihi naija-sukha-anubhuutihi," meaning
that if the jiiva were to enjoy "bliss and all divine powers except
the power of creation," then the jiiva would indeed have those powers
as its svaruupa -- and it does not; to quote Madhva upon a point which
is obvious: "Na hi aham sarvagnyaha, sarveshvaro, nirduhkho, nirdosha
iti vaa kasyachit anubhavaha; asti cha tat viparyayena anubhavaha." We
do not experience 'I am all-knowing, the Lord of all, without pain,
without flaw'; the opposite of this is the experience. And while the
jiiva experiences a small portion of its naija-sukha during sleep, it
does not experience any of the Lord's characteristics during sleep.

>    What happens to those who meditate on the Saguna Brahman? Sankara
>    says, in his commentary on sutras 4.3.7-11, that they enjoy bliss
>    until the dissolution of the universe and then merge into the
>    unconditioned (Nirguna) Brahman. Thus even according to Sankara,
>    meditation on the Saguna Brahman will eventually lead to the highest
>    state.
> 

However, it is surely the case that most, if not all, jiivas would rather 
experience continous bliss and joy, rather than be transformed into the 
nirguna Brahman who experiences nothing? And to snatch away such joy from 
a jiiva is definitely not a promotion to the highest state; it is a 
diabolical reversal, and runs against Shruti statements that say that a 
mukta is never disturbed, nor hindered in its joy. And according to 
Madhva, "moksho hi sarva-purushaarthottamaha," and of course, he means 
*his* kind of moksha; a mukta jiiva cannot be stepped up, since it is 
already as high as it can get.

>  7) amalA bhaktih tatsAdhanam | The means of achieving Moksha is
>     uncontaminated Bhakti.
> 
>      Krishna clearly states that bhakti and the worship of the
>      unmanifested (Brahman)  both lead to the same goal. Krishna also
>      adds that the meditation on the unmanifested Brahman is very
>      difficult and thus recommends the path of Bhakti to Arjuna.
>      Of all the impediments to spiritual progress, the ego is the most
>      formidable one. The Acharya describes this ego as the great 
serpent,
>      ahankAraghorAhi in his VivekacUDAmaNi.  This serpent, which has
>      three heads representing the three gunas, is very hard to conquer.
> 

As far as I know, "amalaa bhaktihi" is not merely translated as 
"uncontaminated bhakti"; it signifies the presence of both knowledge and 
bhakti simultaneously, within one framework. You will recall that Krishna 
Himself has said "na hi gnyaanena sadrsham pavitram iha vidyate." Madhva 
also says, in the Anu-bhaashya: "Mithyaagnyaanena cha tamo, gnyaanenaiva 
param padam." This means that false, or illusory, knowledge leads to 
eternal hell, and the understanding of this fact, as well as correct 
knowledge, lead to mukti. 

And according to Madhva, it is not so much the ego that prevents one
from reaching mukti, as the non-perception of the five differences
correctly; also, "Mokshascha Vishnu-prasaadena vinaa na labhyate,"
which means that one who worships the nirguna Grahman will not attain
moksha -- bhakti toward the Lord Vishnu, and worship of the nirguna
Brahman, are markedly different in this respect.

>      Even seemingly lofty ideals like love for one's community, 
religion,
>      and nation, are nothing but extensions of the ego and  when 
carried
>      too far, become stumbling blocks in the path of spiritual 
development.

That is why Krishna says "mayyeva mana aadhatsva, mayi buddhim niveshaya, 
nivasishyasi mayi eva, ata uurdhvam na samshayaha." One is supposed to 
work for Him only, not for any other cause.

>      When one resorts to Bhakti, this terrible serpent will be subdued
>      by Krishna just as He subdued the serpent Kaliya. Then the mind 
will
>      be purified like the waters of Yamuna and will be conducive to the
>      development of Hari Bhakti.
> 

No argument here, but this is not dealing with any of the differences 
between Advaita and Tatvavaada.

>      When a person is situated in pure Bhakti, that person becomes fit 
to
>      acquire the knowledge of Para Brahman, Hari. In fact, the supreme
>      Purana, Bhagavata brings out this message beautifully:
>      the skandhas 1-10 develop the practice of Bhakti gradually and the
>      11th skandha deals with the finest form of advaita. No one can 
deny
>      the advaitic nature of the Uddhava Gita in the 11th skandha. So
>      prominent is the extreme monistic message of this part of the
>      Bhagavata that Madhva had to tone it down  considerably in his
>      BhAgavata tAtparya. The Bhagavata, thus, establishes that the
>      practice of  Bhakti leads to BrahmajnAna.

I haven't studied that portion in great detail, but I would definitely 
have the audacity to deny that it conveys Advaita, and in support of my 
objection, I would make the points that such interpretation is 
inconsistent (the rest of the Bhaagavata is not conveying Advaita), and 
subject to upajiivya virodha.

[*chomp*]

>  8) akShAditritayam pramANam | The means of right knowledge are 
perception,
>     inference, and scriptural testimony, ie. pratyaksha, aumAna, and 
Sabda.
> 
>     Advaita accepts all the three above and also adds upamAna 
(comparison),
>     arthApatti (postulation) and anupalabdhi (non-apprehension). 
Pratyaksha
>     or perception is an independent means of knowledge that falls 
within the
>     range of senses. That is why GangeSa upAdhyAya, the exponent of the
>     navya nyAya school,  defines perception as
>     jnAnAkAraNakam jnAnam, knowledge to which no other knowledge is
>     instrumental. Inference or anumAna is dependent on perception; 
Sabda
>     pramANa is dependent on both perception and inference as far as
>     sensory knowledge is concerned. But Sabda is an independent means 
of
>     suprasensible knowledge.

I'm not sure you have this put down right; as far as I know, it is
some other schools like Saankhya, etc., that add these other kinds of
pramaana. Both Advaita and Tatvavaada have just the three, pratyaksha,
anumaana, and aagama. Bauddha doctrine denies aagama, and applies only
pratyaksha and anumaana. And abhaava, which you, like some others,
call anupalabdhi, can according to Madhva be classed as one of the
three recognized types of pramaana, depending on the source that tells
us of the abhaava (absence).

In any event, should you say that Advaita recognizes six sources of 
knowledge rather than three, this is an irreconcilable difference -- 
Madhva says "arthaapattyupame anumaa visheshaha," or arthaapatti and 
upamaana are special cases of anumaana. I don't know why you call 
arthaapatti to be "postulation"; the standard case for that is supposed 
to be "piino Devadattaha; diva na bhunkte -- iti, raatro bhunkte," or: 
"Devadatta is very stout; he does not eat during the daytime -- thus, he 
eats at night." Basically, under arthaapatti, you consider all possible 
cases for an event, rule out all but one of them, and claim the one that 
remains, to be true. This, Madhva says, is also an inference, and is not a 
new type of pramaana. 

Abhaava is classed as one of the three types of inference, Madhva says, 
depending on the case under which it occurs. For instance, suppose you go 
into a room expecting to find someone in there; you find the room empty. 
This is a standard case of abhaava, which Madhva says is 
"abhaava-pratyaksha" or direct perception of an absence. Similarly, one 
can find cases of abhaava-anumaana, and of abhaava-aagama.

> 
>     The Dvaitins' excessive emphasis on anumAna (inference) and 
perception,
>     seems a little childish. Since logical inference is based on 
perception,
>     logical arguments can be useful in reasoning about the empirical 
reality.

Perhaps the flavor of the above paragraph is slightly below the belt; in 
any event, this sounds like a little case of sour grapes to me -- Advaita 
does not hesitate to use logic when it thinks it can get away with it -- 
the complaints pour in only when its cards are trumped.

>     Hence, logic will be of limited use in dealing with suprasensous
>     knowledge. It may only be useful in showing the possibility of
>     transcendental facts, such as Brahman, Atman, etc., but it is 
incapable
>     of conclusively establishing those facts. We need Sruti to reveal 
truths

Logic is not a primary tool for Tatvavaada; Madhva quotes Vyaasa as 
saying "praabalyam aagamasya eva," and accepts this dictum fully; 
scripture is the strongest of the pramaanas. However, logic does have an 
important supporting role, in showing self-contradiction in other 
possible hypotheses, etc. Logic may *not* be discarded, and in any case, 
the flavor of the last few lines is quite non-conciliatory; I take it you 
give that up as impossible?

>     that are beyond the range of the senses. Again, when it comes to 
Sruti,
>     Dvaitins needlessly use extensive logical machinery to interpret 
even
>     direct, unambiguous statements. If they think perceptual knowledge 
and
>     logic take precedence over Sruti whenever it is in conflict with 
them,

Well, what is "direct, unambiguous" to you in one way might be so in
another way to me. And such being the case, there are only two ways a
dispute in interpretation can be settled. One is by taking other
Shruti quotes and comparing the meaning, and the second is by
logic. It is your own position that pratyaksha is not very
useful. However, Advaita chooses Shruti selectively, mislabeling some
as "atatvaavedaka" and "anuvaadaka."  And now here you generally
condemn opponents' offer to use logic. Does that not amount to a
flight from reason? Why else would you rather condemn your opponents'
motives and ability in applying logic, than find the truth?

>     let them read the KhanDanakhanDakhAdya of SrIharSha MiSra, where he
>     systematically routs the logical arguments of the logicians using 
logic!
> 

One gets you ten, a Tatvavaadi, even a relative neophyte like myself, 
will have this person on the mat inside of ten minutes! After all, we are 
not called "prachhanna taarkika" for nothing!

And here again, I notice that the mood for reconciliation seems to be 
off. So now the mask is off, and it's a knock-out, drag-out fight? I 
would have hoped not.

>     In this connection, VidyAraNya SvAmi makes the following remarks
>     in the PancadaSI, a celebrated classic of Advaita:
> 

Actually, this is somewhat off-course considering the title of your 
posting, since this scholar's remarks are again not conciliatory, and 
since he is not accepted as a prophet by all present.

>      vastutvam ghoShayantyasya vedAntAh sakalA api |
>      saptnarUpam vastvanyanna sahante' tra kincana  || 8.66
> 
>      All the upanishads proclaim the reality of this (Brahman);
>      at the same time they do not admit the reality of any other
>      entity.

False! Apparently, he was not aware of "satya Aatmaa satyo jiivaha satyam 
bhidaa satyam bhidaa satyam bhidaa." All this is assuming, of course, 
that I would take the trouble to look up Shruti, when I know of my own 
knowledge that the world around me is real.

> 
>      Srutyartham viSadIkurmo na tarkAdvacmi kincana |
>      tena tArkikaSankAnAmatra ko'vasaro vada         || 8.67
> 
>      I explain the meaning of Sruti; I do not explain it merely
>      from a logical standpoint. Tell me, where is the opportunity
>      to raise doubts about the logic here ?

Oh, plenty. For starters, take the upajiivya virodha! His saying that
he does not explain "merely" from a logical standpoint amounts to a
tacit admission that his explanations are sometimes illogical.

> 
>      tasmAt kutarkam santyajya mumukShuh SrutimASrayet |
>      Srutau tu mAyA jIveSau karotIti pradarSitam      || 8.68
> 
>      The aspirant for moksha should give up resorting to faulty
>      logic and fix his conviction on Sruti. That the Jiva and
>      ISvara are creations of Maya is shown in the Sruti.
> 

Some preachment! Why does he not clarify that "Shrutim aashrayet" means 
"take only a certain interpretation of certain Shruti verses, that are 
the only ones that I deign to consider relevant, or 'tatvaavedaka'"? It 
is certainly not the case that all Shruti is supportive of the tenet that 
the jiiva and Iishvara are creations of Maayaa; especially not the 
latter. If he insists, let him try his hand at the "satya Aatmaa...," 
etc., or even with "dvaa suparnaa sayujaa sukhaayaa."

> 9) akhilAmnAyaikavedyo harih | Hari, and Hari alone,  is to be
>    known from all the scriptures.
> 
>    The Brahma sutra 1.1.3, SAstrayonitvAt, says that Brahman, Hari
>    is to be known from the scriptures. Since Brahman is the only
>    ultimate Reality, all descriptions in the scriptures, even if
>    they apparently refer to other deities, really describe Him.
>

There seems to be some confusion here. When Krishna said "Vedaischa 
sarvaihi aham eva vedyo," He was not referring to anything except 
Himself, the Paramaatman. No scripture shows the nirguna Brahman to be 
supreme, and in any event, trying to square that with "akhila aamnaaya 
eka-vedyo Harihi" brings about the problems I stated before, about the 
Brahman getting a flaw and becoming flawless, etc.

> 
>    The great teachers of Vedanta have always felt the need to
>   reconcile differing views with their own. In fact, the first
>   chapter of Brahma Sutras is called samanvaya adhyAya or the
>   chapter of reconciliation. Let us follow this example so that
>   we will be spiritually enriched by different schools of Vedanta.

I am not sure who exactly the "great teachers of Vedanta" are supposed to 
be, but Madhva, who may not be one in your view, is firmly set against 
the all-roads-lead-to-Rome approach, and takes the time to unforgivingly 
denounce all contrary hypotheses; his statement "mithyaagnyaanena cha 
tamo" is also quite clear in this respect.

[*chomp*]

> 
>   SrI vAsudevArpaNam |
> 
> 
>  Anand
> 

Aachaaryaaha Srimad-Aachaaryaaha, santu-mey janma-janmani.

Regards,

Shrisha Rao






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