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Re: Dvaita and Advaita: A Reconciliation
Shrisha Rao <shrisha@lcl.cmu.edu> wrote:
>> unenviable, to say the least. At the risk of being criticized
>> by both sides, especially by Dvaitins who may find my attempt
>> to bring Dvaita into the Advaitic fold obnoxious, I will make
>> an attempt to show that what the Dvaitins talk about fits nicely
>> within the framework of Advaita. Of course, criticisms from both
>> sides are welcome!
>>
>
>At the outset, I point out that the mislabeling of Tatvavaada as Dvaita,
>tho carried to a great finesse in many works in the past, is actually a
>barrier, because such usage tends to emphasize the differences between it
>and Advaita, while de-emphasizing the points there are in common.
I am using the term Dvaita here following scholars such as Dr. BNK Sharma,
who does not find any negative connotation with it; he does suggest an
alternative -- svatantra-advitIya-brahmavAda. But then he defends the
usage of "Dvaita", because Vyasatirtha himself uses it to desrcibe his
Guru, SrIpAdarAya as "dvaita-kula-tilaka."
>[*chomp*]
>According to Tatvavaada, all *five* differences are held to be eternally
>true, not just one of them.
I know the five differences are eternal according to Dvaita, but I
accept this as one of the irreconcilable points between the two
systems. First of all, I did point out in the beginning of the post
that Advaita will reconcile with other systems to the extent that they
do not violate its own basic tenets. So the job I am trying to do here
is to reconcile as much as possible and not worry about the
irreconcilable issues.
>> There are two possible Advaitic interpretations here. a) Hari is the
>> Brahman described in Vedanta. Brahman is the One and Only Reality.
>I am not aware of any Advaita scholar ever interpreting 'Hari' to mean
>the nirguna Brahman; Hari specifically describes a quality: "yaha harati
>sa Harihi," or one who takes away (the bondage of a jiiva, etc.) is Hari.
>Thus, Hari is not the nirguna Brahman -- the latter is not described as
>having such a quality (obviously), and is also not called Hari by any
>Advaita scholar.
Advaita accepts
that to those who meditate on the saguNa Brahman, the nirguNa Brahman
manifests itself. Further, the saguNa Brahman is not in any way
inferior to the NirguNa Brahman, at least according to Sankara.
Now, the saguNa Brahman Himself is not tainted by the three gunas,
although He may have infinite number of transcendental attributes,
asankhyeyakalyANaguNAkAram sakaladoShagandhavidhuram.
He is full of an infinite number of auspicious attributes, but free
from all imperfections.
I agree there is a difference between nirguNa and saguNa brahman, but
there is no question of who is the superior of the two. They are one
and the same. Hari is easily recognized to be the saguNa brahman. He is
also the nirguNa brahman. For example, says Sankara's Hari stuti (37):
sattAmAtram kevalavijnAnamajam sat
sUkShmam nityam tattvamasItyAtmasutAya
sAmnAmante prAha pitA yam vibhumAdyam
tam samsAradhvAntavinASam harimIDe || 37 ||
In the Chandogya Upanishad, the father Uddalaka told his son
Svetaketu, "tat tvam asi", "you are Brahman." This (Brahman)
is sattAmAtram, pure existence , kevala-vijnAnam, pure consciousness,
sUkshmam, beyond the reach of the senses, sat, real, nityam,
eternal and It is (none other than) Hari, the destroyer of the
darkness that is this empirical existence.
It is seen here that Hari is identified with the Brahman of the
Upanishads.
>I think saying that Iishvara is Brahman "with the limiting adjunct mAyA"
>definitely introduces a circularity into the argument, as you say later
>that "He controls it and is not controlled by it." If he is not
>controlled by it, how is it a "limiting adjunct"?
Brahman is the One that is limited by mAyA and becomes ISvara. I don't
see any circularity here.
>Even if Hari, the Paramaatman, has a limitation for whatever reason, then
>this is definitely a digression from Tatvavaada:
>
>|| Sadaagamaika vigneyam samatiita ksharaaksharam ||
>|| Naaraayanam sadaa vande nirdosha ashesha sadgunam ||
> ~~~~~~~~
Certainly. Hari is both the ISvara and saguNa Brahman. As ISvara He is
the controller of all; as saguNa brahman He is to be sought by aspirants
of Moksha. He is also the inner controller, antaryAmin, of all beings.
>If, on the other hand, it is claimed that it is the nirguna Brahman, with
>the limiting adjunct, that becomes the Paramaatman, and that the
>Paramaatman has no flaw as a consequence, then there are two problems:
>
>1> Something, namely the nirguna Brahman, picks up a flaw, namely the
>limiting adjunct, and becomes something flawless, namely the Paramaatman.
>Does it make sense for something to pick up a flaw and thus become
>flawless? No -- this would be preposterous.
>
>2> There are two entities, namely, the limiting adjunct or the flaw, and
>Brahman, or the entity that acquires the flaw. The flaw cannot be the
>same as Brahman -- then the flaw would be Brahman's self-same nature, and
>Iishvara, rather than the nirguna Brahman, becomes the Paaramaarthika
>satya. Also, the nirguna Brahman, being characterized by this
>characteristic, would no longer remain nirguna. However, on accepting
>these two entities, abheda is lost.
>From the standpoint of nirguNa brahman, this conversion into ISvara, the
creation and control of the world, the jivas who are controlled by It,
etc. are all unreal. If you think the nirguNa brahman picks up a flaw,
we say this act does not take place! It is the nirguNa brahman that
exists as the One and Only Reality. All other entities don't exist.
Thus limiting of nirguNa brahman, etc., are only apparently real.
>[*chomp*]
>> trikAlasarvadeSIyaniShedhApratiyogitA sattocyate| meaning
>> "not being the counter correlate of negation with respect to ALL
>> three periods of time and space is reality." If something
>> exists in one of the three periods of time, past, present and
>> future, then it is regarded as real.
>
>Slight change: if something exists in *at least* one of the three; it may
>exist in more than one.
You are right. I missed that point.
>There is one difference, tho. Srimad Ananda Tiirtha also says
>"padaarthasvaruupaat bhedasya," meaning that bheda, or difference, is the
>svaruupa, or self-same nature, of a padaartha, or entity. Thus, according
>to him, not only are the three kinds of entities Iishvara, jiiva and jada
>separately real, their differences are also their self-same natures. The
>padaartha-svaruupatva of bheda is irreconcilable with the
>vyaavahaarikatva of bheda claimed by Advaita -- the svaruupa according to
>Ananda Tiirtha is a Paaramaarthika satya; something that is added on, or
>lost, changed, modified, etc., cannot be the self-same nature.
You are right again. If Ananda tirtha says something other than
brahman is also a pAramArthika satya, that is irreconcilable. But
as I said earlier, I am not trying to reconcile each and every detail
of Dvaita with Advaita.
>Upon which, the Tatvavaadi will probably point to statements like "Satya
>Aatmaa, satyo jiivaha, satyam bhidaa satyam bhidaa satyam bhidaa," etc.,
>which speak of eternal difference.
This is probably a subject of another discussion and I will leave it
alone here.
>On being pressed further to explain why the Brhadaaranyaka would
>support abheda, then, he would say it doesn't, as did Srimad Ananda
>Tiirtha -- "na cha abhede kaschid aagamaha; santi cha bhede
>sarvaagamaaha." Shruti also describes the Paramaatman as "amrtasya
>setuhu," or a support to all the mukta jiivas, and says
>"Iishamaashritya tishthanti muktaaha samsaarasaagaraat.
>Yatheshtabhogaa bhoktaaro Brahmaanta uttarottaram" -- the jiivas are
>supported by the Lord after mukti, and get whatever they desire
>directly from him, with no need for jagat-vyaapaara, or worldly
>activity. That is why the Lord is also worshipped as: "Om
>jagadvyaapaaravarjam Om."
Yes, in the Brahmaloka where the jivas obtain the so-called "mukti"
and enjoy bliss, they retain their individuality as jivas, but
once they merge in the nirguNa brahman, all such activity ceases.
The One Brahman or Self enjoys Itself with Itself. There is no
enjoyment which includes a subject-object relationship.
>Therefore, the Brhadaaranyaka says, the Tatvavaadi would continue, that
>if a jiiva is in mukti and supported fully by the Lord ("Aatmaivaabhuut")
>then it has no need for any jagat-vyaapaara, and thus, "kena pashyet,
>kena jighret, kena vijaaniiyaat," etc.
Your interpretation of "AtmaivAbut" as "supported fully by the Lord"
is totally beyond my comprehension.
>> Separateness or difference is real. "nAbhAva upalabdheh" says
>> the Brahma Sutra (II.2.28). The things in the external world are
>> not nonexistent because of our perception and consciousness of them.
>> Since the world is real and we are aware of different things in the
>> world, differences are necessarily real.
>
>I do not know the correct context where the Brahma Suutra says "na
>abhaava upalabdhehe," but it is not clear why your interpretation
>follows from that. In a bland sense, what it seems to convey is that
>something, it is not clear what, is not proved or obtained ("na
>upalabdhehe") in the absence of something else ("abhaava"). At this
>point, it is worth noting that according to Ananda Tiirtha, our senses
>can perceive entities, and they can also perceive the absence of the
>entities whose presense they can perceive. The ears can hear sounds,
>and they can also make out silence; the eyes can see light, and they
>can also see darkness, etc.
Both Ramanuja and Madhva agree with Sankara as far as this sutra is
concerned.
>> "Where there is duality (dvaita), there one sees another", says the
>> BRhadAraNyaka. Thus, while in the state of duality or the empirical
>> world, perceptual knowledge is real.
>>
>> This establishes that the world is not a purely imaginary thing
>> such as the horns of a hare.
>>
>I can understand the above if there were some need to counter a total
>nihilist who claimed that the universe is wholly false, but why is it
>necessary with a Tatvavaadi, who is in any case going to insist that the
>universe is *not* false at all?
Advaita is sometimes equated with nihilism by people who either 1)
do not understand Advaita clearly or 2) are driven by sectarian
considerations and want to intentionally depict a distorted picture
of the system. So I had to give Sankara's interpretation just to show
that Advaita holds an objective view of the world, much different from
both subjective idealism and nihilism.
>If "jiivaganaaha Harehe anucharaaha" is to be given an Advaita
>interpretation, then, the Brahman with the limitation of the collective
>Maayaa would be the controller of the Brahman with the individual Maayaa.
>However, this is akin to saying that someone who has all the diseases in
>the world is better off than one who has just one of the world's
>diseases, and is ludicrous as a consequence.
It is not. ISvara knows that He is none other than Brahman; a jiva
does not know thus. ISvara is the controller of mAyA, despite the
fact that He is Brahman limited by the collective mAyA. He is affected
by mAyA in the sense that He is filled with pure sattva guNa only. There
are no blemishes in Him.
>is obvious: "Na hi aham sarvagnyaha, sarveshvaro, nirduhkho, nirdosha
>iti vaa kasyachit anubhavaha; asti cha tat viparyayena anubhavaha." We
>do not experience 'I am all-knowing, the Lord of all, without pain,
>without flaw'; the opposite of this is the experience. And while the
>jiiva experiences a small portion of its naija-sukha during sleep, it
>does not experience any of the Lord's characteristics during sleep.
If ordinary experience were the best judge, then we would all be
under the belief that the sun revolves around the earth! Just as
we need scientific insight to correct this ordinary experience,
we need spiritual insight to show that Brahman is all there is.
>However, it is surely the case that most, if not all, jiivas would rather
>experience continous bliss and joy, rather than be transformed into the
>nirguna Brahman who experiences nothing? And to snatch away such joy from
>a jiiva is definitely not a promotion to the highest state; it is a
>diabolical reversal, and runs against Shruti statements that say that a
>mukta is never disturbed, nor hindered in its joy. And according to
No. Brahman is bliss, bliss and bliss, and nothing else. Why would a
jiva protest the promotion to this state?
Anando brahmeti vyajAnAt, he (bhRgu) knew Bliss as Brahman.
(Tai. U. 3.6.1)
>I'm not sure you have this put down right; as far as I know, it is
>some other schools like Saankhya, etc., that add these other kinds of
>pramaana. Both Advaita and Tatvavaada have just the three, pratyaksha,
>anumaana, and aagama. Bauddha doctrine denies aagama, and applies only
Yes, I have put it down right.
>In any event, should you say that Advaita recognizes six sources of
>knowledge rather than three, this is an irreconcilable difference --
>Madhva says "arthaapattyupame anumaa visheshaha," or arthaapatti and
Irreconcilable if you try to capture Advaitic methods of knowledge
within Dvaita's. In the converse direction there is reconciliation.
I think Vidyasankar posted a clarification of arthApatti, anupalabdhi
and upamAna, so I won't repeat it here.
>Perhaps the flavor of the above paragraph is slightly below the belt; in
>any event, this sounds like a little case of sour grapes to me -- Advaita
>does not hesitate to use logic when it thinks it can get away with it --
>the complaints pour in only when its cards are trumped.
I am sorry if that sounded as below the belt. As regards Advaita's cards
being trumped, that did not happen. Vyasatirtha did a superb job in
criticizing Advaita in his Nyayamrta, but all his objections were
ably met by Madhusudana Sarasvati in his Advaita siddhi. Besides, attacking
Advaita from a logical point of view is nothing new; logicians and
Buddhists had done it before, and failed.
>Logic may *not* be discarded, and in any case,
>the flavor of the last few lines is quite non-conciliatory; I take it you
>give that up as impossible?
Advaita too does not say that one must accept all its doctrines
with blind faith. In fact, it encourages logical thought in one of the
three steps to Brahman realization, ie. manana, the other two being
SravaNa and nididhyAsana. However, logic must be guided by Sruti
as far as spiritual matters are concerned. The important difference
between the two schools lies in what they consider to be "scripture."
For example, SmRti plays a subordinate role to Sruti in Advaita, but
not so in Dvaita. Madhva quotes from a wide variety of Puranas,
PancarAtras, and other non-Sruti literature, apart from the standard
Sruti texts, in his commentaries.
>condemn opponents' offer to use logic. Does that not amount to a
>flight from reason? Why else would you rather condemn your opponents'
>motives and ability in applying logic, than find the truth?
Vidyaranya is not condemning logic per se here. All he says is that one
must give up kutarka, faulty logic.
>Oh, plenty. For starters, take the upajiivya virodha! His saying that
>he does not explain "merely" from a logical standpoint amounts to a
>tacit admission that his explanations are sometimes illogical.
For a person who thinks the sun revolves around the earth, an
explanation of the converse fact may seem illogical, because it is,
after all, not in accordance with "ordinary experience."
>>
>> The great teachers of Vedanta have always felt the need to
>> reconcile differing views with their own. In fact, the first
>> chapter of Brahma Sutras is called samanvaya adhyAya or the
>> chapter of reconciliation. Let us follow this example so that
>> we will be spiritually enriched by different schools of Vedanta.
>
>I am not sure who exactly the "great teachers of Vedanta" are supposed to
>be, but Madhva, who may not be one in your view, is firmly set against
>the all-roads-lead-to-Rome approach, and takes the time to unforgivingly
>denounce all contrary hypotheses; his statement "mithyaagnyaanena cha
>tamo" is also quite clear in this respect.
The Gita and the Bhagavata have laid down three paths to Moksha --
jnAna, bhakti and karma. There are "three roads to Rome."
>[*chomp*]
>Shrisha Rao
Anand
