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Re: Siva as yogi?
Ramakrishnan Balasubramanian <rbalasub@ecn.purdue.edu> wrote:
>
>No, I have to disagree here. The "knowledge is self valid" just means that
>THE "knowledge" is apparent always, WITHOUT any other support. Thus, since the
>only self-valid knowledge in all 3 states, viz, waking, dreaming and deep
>sleep, is the feeling of "I", the un-differentiated, unbroken absorption in the
>"I" alone is true knowledge.
This is so, but there is more to the theory of "svata: pramANa, parata:
apramANa". This view of knowledge applies to all kinds of knowledge, be it
brahmajnAna or mithyAjnAna. This theory of knowledge is also used by pUrva
mImAmsakas, who do not teach a non-dual doctrine. Note that "valid" does not
mean "right" - at least in the original sense of the Sanskrit words. All kinds
of jNana is svata: pramANa, but there can be mithyAjnAna (false knowledge) and
samyag-jnAna (right knowledge).
For example, in the case of the rajju-sarpa, the knowledge "this is a snake" is
valid in itself, giving rise to the fear of the imagined snake. That the snake
is entirely imaginary does not take away from the fact that for the imaginer,
it is real enough, at least for the time being. When the correct knowledge
"this is rope, not a snake" arises, this knowledge is also svata: pramANa, and
it acts as the sublating knowledge that tells you that the previous cognition
of snake was mithyA. However, so long as the snake is seen, it is self-valid
(svata: pramANa), and the snake is invalidated only by the other knowledge that
it is rope (parata: apramANa).
This is quite standard, classical advaita explanation of truth and error. The
error is not known to be error till the right knowledge is known. Once the
right kowledge is known, the error is understood to have always been error,
even when the error was imagined to be the truth.
In the final analysis, the svata: pramANa knowledge of brahman is the only
knowlege that is not sublated by other knowledge. On the other hand, the
mithyAjnAna of duality is sublated by brahmajnAna. It is only on the dawn of
brahmajnAna that it is known that duality is mithyA, not otherwise. This
brahmajnAna is beyond the mere intellectual understanding of non-duality.
>
>The "reality" of the world as external to oneself is certainly a delusion,
>whether it be the ordinary or extra-ordinary man.
But then, the ordinary man does not know that the reality of the world as
external to the Atman is delusion, does he? His avidyA is anAdi. As far as he
is concerned, he acts assuming that his knowledge of the world, however deluded
he may be, is valid. For him, the reality of the external world is valid
enough.
>
>>to reject duality as "provisionally real". Rather it is the aparokshAnubhUti of
>
>So does the "realized" person reject duality as provisionally real?
No, the question of provisionally real does not arise. The "realized" person
knows "sarvam AtmA" and there is no duality.
I don't agree with Mark D.'s categorization of "provisionally real".
vyAvahArika satya is better translated as "empirical truth". Thus the BU says
"yatra tu dvaitamiva bhavati,... " etc. It is not denied that there seems to be
duality in the empirical world. It is there all around us, and everyone assumes
that this duality is the way it always is. And so long as the brahmajnAna does
not arise, this duality remains.
>
>>brama-jnAna that destroys duality. This leads to the distinction between
>
>If there IS duality, then it has SOME reality, either permanent or temporary,
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>temporary if duality exists and later disappears, or real if duality always
>exists. The fact is that there is NO duality.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Only from the pAramArthika standpoint. When talking advaita, one has to
constantly jump between pAramArthika and vyAvahArika standpoints. Because all
speech assumes the subject-object duality, there is no other way but to talk
from the vyAvahArika standpoint also. So long as speech persists, we are forced
to presume duality. If we are to speak, but describe non-duality only from a
pAramArthika perspective, it is always misunderstood as elaborate nihilism. The
criticism that advaita is "pracanna bauddham" stems from such misunderstanding.
That is why the most advanced advaita teachers prefer silence to speech.
>From the pAramArthika standpoint, as the Gaudapada kArikas say, there is no
liberation, there are no realized persons, and there are no bound-persons.
Duality does seem to have reality from the vyAvahArika standpoint however.
"Some temporary reality" assumes birth and death, and that indicates
anityatvam. In advaita terms, what is really real has to be eternal.
>
>>pAramArthika and vyAvahArika satya. But to interpret vyAvahArika satya as
>>"provisionally real" misses the point. So, there is no duality between the real
>>and the illusory. This criticism (of a duality between the real and the
>
>What do you mean by "there is no duality between the real and illusory"? If it
>is real it cannot be illusory and vice-versa. The fact is that reality alone
>IS. Anything else is a delusion, just like the woman searching for her necklace
>which was already around her neck.
Advaita clearly does not see any "duality between the real and the illusory".
However, proponents of other schools think that advaita itself ends up in this
kind of a duality. If you read Ken's original posting again, you will see that
Mark D. makes this criticism. I was only pointing out that the criticism is
unfounded, and also been answered centuries earlier.
>
>>illusory - I don't agree with the word illusory, but I'll go with it anyway)
>>has been raised centuries earlier by Jayatirtha in his nyAyasudhA and answered
>>by Madhusdana Sarasvati in his advaita-siddhi.
>>
>>Besides, advaita vedAnta is faced with the additional responsibility of
>>interpreting Sruti, something that Kashmir Saivism does not try to do. neha
>>nAnAsti kincana - there is no plurality here, says the upanishad. The
>>maintenance of non-duality as the essential nature of the absolute is based on
>>such upanishadic teachings. However, this is valid only for the mukta. The
>
>How can the truth be valid only for the Mukta? Tat tvam Asi - note that it is
>totally unqualified. "Mukta-ness" again plays no role.
>From the vyAvahArika standpoint, it is only the mukta who does not return, is
it not? The truth is always valid, but he who doesn't know it remains in
samsAra. Also, it is only the mukta who really knows "neha nAnAsti kincana",
thereby escaping samsAra. It is quite one thing to understand tattvamasi from
an intellectual perspective. It is quite another to really know It. We all say
tattvamasi over the net. Does that mean we are really brahmavit? Or that we are
already jIvanmuktas? I know I am not. I can argue for an advaitic explanation
of tattvamsi. But I am still moved by my desires, and am nowhere close to
nishkAmya karma, let alone naishkarmya siddhi. The truth of non-duality is no
doubt valid, I *know* it from an intellectual standpoint, but I am still
subject to ignorance.
>
>>promised non-return (na sa punarAvartate) holds only for the mukta and not for
>>the rest of us.
>
>There is neither return nor non-return, or coming or going. If the truth is
>something external and can change with "mukta-ness" it cannot be the truth, for
>the sruti declares that truth alone, always IS (Ken quoted it in his post).
ajAtivAda is fine from the pAramArthika standpoint, but does not explain things
from a vyAvahArika standpoint. When the Sruti says "na sa punarAvartate", it is
talking from the vyAvahArika standpoint. I am not saying that the truth is
external or that it changes with "mukta-ness". What I am saying is that the
mukta alone really knows the Truth, the rest of us do not.
>
>>Whether we emphasize sat (Being) or cit (Consciousness) or Ananda (Bliss) in
>>our respective philosophies, the truth is that It is ekameva-advitIyam. All
>>criticisms of this teaching of non-duality are based upon a reluctance to give
>>up one's habit of thinking in dvandvas, and are due to extending one's
>>experience of ordinary reality to the realm of moksha, of which the vast
>
>Well, in the non-dual doctrine there is neither "ordinary reality" nor "realm of
>moksha". Since the truth is self-evident and always exists, there cannot
>be an "ordinary reality" apart from it. It would be a total contradiction.
True, there is no ordinary reality independent of the truth. The truth,
however, does not appear to be self-evident to the vast majority of people. For
them, duality seems to be so self-evident, that no amount of repeating the
non-dual truth of "there is no return nor non-return" makes them understand
non-duality. "Ordinary reality" and "realm of moksha" are therefore ways of
speaking about the non-dual doctrine from the vyAvahArika perspective.
>
>>majority of us have had no experience.
>>
>> S. Vidyasankar
>
>Ramakrishnan.
>--
>That it does not see in that state is because, though seeing then, it does not
>see; for the vision of the witness can never be lost, because it is imperish-
>able. But, there is not that second thing separate from it which it can see.
> Brihadaranyaka Upanishad - IV.iii.23
S. Vidyasankar
