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Re: Siva as Yogi
In article <4di8i3$fpg@babbage.ece.uc.edu> Ramakrishnan
Balasubramanian <rbalasub@ecn.purdue.edu> writes:
> Vidyasankar Sundaresan <vidya@cco.caltech.edu> wrote:
>
> > Subject: Re: Siva as Yogi?
> >
> No, I have to disagree here. The "knowledge is self valid" just
means that
> THE "knowledge" is apparent always, WITHOUT any other support.
Thus, since the
> only self-valid knowledge in all 3 states, viz, waking, dreaming
and deep
> sleep, is the feeling of "I", the un-differentiated, unbroken
absorption in the
> "I" alone is true knowledge.
True, but you must remember that classical advaita looks at the
Brahman-Atman relationship from two standpoints, the pAramArthika
(transcendental) and the vyAvahArika (empirical). The theory of
knowledge that says "svata: pramANa, parata: apramANa" is applied to
both levels of understanding. In the vyAvahArika level, what it means
can be understood by the rajju-sarpa example.
In this case, a rope is mistakenly cognized as a snake. As long as
the mistaken cognition of snake persists, the snake is "real" for the
cognizer. As a result, the fear of the snake is also "real" for him.
That is what is indicated by "svata: pramANa". Only when the true
cognition of rope arises, does the cognition of "snake" get sublated.
Thus "parata: pramANa". The "self-valid" cognition of snake gets
invalidated by the "other knowledge" that this is rope. As such, the
idea that jNana is svata: pramANa, parata: apramANa, applies both to
mithyAjnAna (false knowledge) and samyagjnAna (right knowledge). The
word "valid" does not necessarily mean real, either in the original
words in Sankrit or even in ordinary English usage.
The same theory of knowledge applies to the "ordinary man" who does
not know the truth of brahman. Our usual ways of knowing the world
indicate a plurality. This is "self-valid" i.e. valid for the
ordinary man who sees the plurality. It is only the brahmavit who
"knows" the real truth. In the case of the brahmavit, even he spent
some time in his life assuming that the plurality that he saw around
him was really real. The brahmajnAna acts as the sublating jnAna that
invalidates the previous experience of duality.
This theory of knowledge is used by pUrva mImAmsakas also, to show
that the Vedas are self-valid, and that there is no "other knowledge"
that can show the Veda to be false. On the other hand, there are
other schools of Indian philosophy that have the opposite theory
"svata: apramANa, parata: pramANa".
>
> The "reality" of the world as external to oneself is certainly a
delusion,
> whether it be the ordinary or extra-ordinary man.
But the deluded man does not know that he is deluded, does he?
>
> >to reject duality as "provisionally real". Rather it is the
aparokshAnubhUti of
>
> So does the "realized" person reject duality as provisionally real?
No. Duality gets sublated for the realized person. He does not see
duality, so the question does not arise.
>
> >brama-jnAna that destroys duality. This leads to the distinction
between
>
> If there IS duality, then it has SOME reality, either permanent or
temporary,
> temporary if duality exists and later disappears, or real if
duality always
> exists. The fact is that there is NO duality.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
At the pAramArthika level, yes. Not so at the vyAvahArika level for
everybody. For the purposes of vyavahAra, I have to presume duality.
This computer I am using, the keyboard I am typing on, the books I
have with me for reference, my neighour who is writing his paper -
all these are seen as separate and distinct from me right now.
What then is the "temporary reality" of this duality? It is the
reality of vyavahAra. Note that according to advaita, temporary
automatically indicates not really real. Only the eternal is really
real.
>
> >pAramArthika and vyAvahArika satya. But to interpret vyAvahArika
satya as
> >"provisionally real" misses the point. So, there is no duality
between the real
> >and the illusory. This criticism (of a duality between the real
and the
>
> What do you mean by "there is no duality between the real and
illusory"? If it
> is real it cannot be illusory and vice-versa. The fact is that
reality alone
> IS. Anything else is a delusion, just like the woman searching for
her necklace
> which was already around her neck.
There is no duality, is there? That is why I say there is no duality
between real and illusory as two categories. Read Ken Stuart's
quotation again. It is Mark D. who is saying something about duality
between real and illusory, not I.
Philosophers who insist on duality criticize advaita saying that
advaita itself lands in a sort of duality between the "real" and the
"illusory". I am only pointing out that this criticism has been
answered in detail ages ago.
>
> >illusory - I don't agree with the word illusory, but I'll go with
it anyway)
> >has been raised centuries earlier by Jayatirtha in his nyAyasudhA
and answered
> >by Madhusdana Sarasvati in his advaita-siddhi.
> >
> >Besides, advaita vedAnta is faced with the additional
responsibility of
> >interpreting Sruti, something that Kashmir Saivism does not try to
do. neha
> >nAnAsti kincana - there is no plurality here, says the upanishad.
The
> >maintenance of non-duality as the essential nature of the absolute
is based on
> >such upanishadic teachings. However, this is valid only for the
mukta. The
>
> How can the truth be valid only for the Mukta? Tat tvam Asi - note
that it is
> totally unqualified. "Mukta-ness" again plays no role.
The truth is eternally valid, no doubt. But it is only the mukta who
can really state the truth of non-duality, no? Let us go back to the
rajju-sarpa. The validity of the rope holds even when it is mistaken
for the snake. But he who sees the snake, does not see the rope.
Obviously, he cannot say with any degree of conviction that it is in
fact a rope. Only he who actually sees the rope can say confidently
"This is a rope." Similarly, only he who has actually had the
anubhava of non-duality can assert non-duality confidently. The rest
of us can only assert non-duality on the basis of an intellectual
argument.
>
> >promised non-return (na sa punarAvartate) holds only for the mukta
and not for
> >the rest of us.
>
> There is neither return nor non-return, or coming or going. If the
truth is
> something external and can change with "mukta-ness" it cannot be
the truth, for
> the sruti declares that truth alone, always IS (Ken quoted it in
his post).
Ajativada is fine at the pAramArthika level. But note that the Sruti
"na sa punarAvartate" describes moksha from the vyAvahArika level. It
assumes an Avartanam, ergo gamanam and punar-Avartanam. All this
coming and going is from the level of vyavahAra. When I say the
promised non-return holds for the mukta only, again I am talking from
the vyAvahArika level.
In discussing advaita, it is impossible not to constantly shift from
the pAramArthika level to the vyAvahArika level. If we all knew
instantly the paramArtha satya, there is no need for Sruti, or gurus
or anything else. So long as we undertake to interpret Sruti, we have
to also take into account the need to talk from a vyAvahArika level.
If we talk only of the pAramArthika level, advaita is likely to be
misunderstood as nihilism. That is why the critics of advaita always
misunderstand the Gaudapada kArikAs as being highly indebted to
mahayana buddhism. The misunderstanding of statements made at the
paramArtha level leads to the charge that advaita is pracanna
bauddham. That is why Sankara is very careful to talk from both
levels in all his bhashyas.
>
> >Whether we emphasize sat (Being) or cit (Consciousness) or Ananda
(Bliss) in
> >our respective philosophies, the truth is that It is
ekameva-advitIyam. All
> >criticisms of this teaching of non-duality are based upon a
reluctance to give
> >up one's habit of thinking in dvandvas, and are due to extending
one's
> >experience of ordinary reality to the realm of moksha, of which
the vast
>
> Well, in the non-dual doctrine there is neither "ordinary reality"
nor "realm of
> moksha". Since the truth is self-evident and always exists, there
cannot
> be an "ordinary reality" apart from it. It would be a total
contradiction.
The paramArtha-vyavahAra levels again. It is true that the paramArtha
satya is always true, and there is no independent ordinary reality,
agreed. However, at the paramArtha level, there is nobody that is
bound, nobody that is liberated, and nothing that can be called
liberation. But from the level of vyavahAra, the paramArtha satya is
itself what is called liberation, consequently there are baddha-jIvas
and jIvanmuktas. If there is no "realm of moksha", what is the use of
calling anybody a realized soul or jIvanmukta?
There is no conflict if you realize that all talk of "ordinary
reality" and "realm of moksha" and "liberated beings" is always made
only at the level of vyavahAra, never from the pAramArthika
standpoint.
Regards,
S. Vidyasankar
