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Re: Lots of hogwash!NOT!!!!!!
Ramakrishnan Balasubramanian <rbalasub@ecn.purdue.edu> wrote:
> Many people, if not most, including advaitins do not understand what advaita
> says by "jagat mitya". A good place to start would be dR^ik dR^ishya viveka.
So what is the dR^ik dR^ishya viveka's definition of `jagat mithyA'?
> >> If so, people could actually question the reality of their dreams
> >> and then come to the conclusion that the dream is unreal.
>
> >So, life is just a dream? Dear friend, even Sankaracharya
> >explicitly disagrees with you! [see Sankara's Brahma-Sutra
> >bhashya, ii.2.29].
>
> Not so fast.
>
> In the upadeshasaahasrii:
>
> Objects that come into being and are capable of being made the
> objects of knowledge are as unreal as those in dream. As duality has
> no existence, knowledge is eternal and objectless IX.7
First off, one notes that the above are just ad hoc hypotheses without
any manner of proof -- where from does one arrive at, much less prove,
the inference rule used in "as duality has no existence, knowledge is
eternal and objectless"? In fact, that sentence is quite meaningless
and/or untrue, upon closer scrutiny. Consider that one *does* lose
the knowledge of the snake, when one acquires the knowledge of the
rope; to say that the knowledge of the snake is eternal is tantamount
to saying that the snake is real. So also, to say that knowledge is
eternal is to say that the universe of experience is real. And of
course, nobody has any experience of "objectless" knowledge: the very
use of `knowledge' invokes in one's mind the standard paradigm of
known, knower, and knowledge -- just as the use of `meal' invokes in
one's mind the triad of food, the person eating, and the act of
eating. To speak of "objectless knowledge" is akin to speaking of a
"foodless meal." If such an entity were to exist, then it could not
be called `knowledge' at all, and should be given some other name.
Besides, there was some argument recently about the VivekachuuDaamaNi
being/not being by Shankara, because it held the dream-state and the
waking-state to be identical, which is not done in Shankara's
Suutra-bhaashya. If that is the case, then even the Upadeshasahasrii
must be straying from the line taken in that work, because it too does
the same thing by holding the illusions of the dream and the waking
state to be alike.
> As there is nothing other than the self in the dreamless sleep, it
> is said by the sruti that the consciousness of the knower is
> eternal. The knowledge of objects in the waking state must be due to
> ignorance. Accept then that its objects are also unreal. IX.8
Again, I fail to follow what the basis is for the inference rule
invoked in the first sentence: how does it make sense to say "as there
is none but the self in the dreamless sleep, thus the knower is
eternal"? One could perhaps say "as there is none but the self in the
dreamless sleep, things other than the knower are non-eternal" -- but
what is said is quite different.
The second sentence is unacceptable also. If knowledge of the entities
perceived in the waking state is due to ignorance, then what is it due
to ignorance *of*? One cannot say it is due to ignorance of the entities
of the waking state -- that is tantamount to saying that knowledge of
such entities is caused by their ignorance, and is patently absurd on
the face of it. Besides, the entities of the waking state are illusory
anyway, and ignorance of such cannot be called ignorance at all; one
who fails to perceive the snake in the rope cannot be called an
ignoramus -- he must in fact be called one of greater vision than one
who does so perceive. For these reasons, the ignorance claimed must be
of the self itself! -- but that is contradictory, for "the consciousness
of the knower is eternal."
For these reasons, one cannot "accept, then, that its objects are also
unreal."
> Further,
>
> Just as dreams appear to be true as long as one does not wake up,
> so, the identification of oneself with the body etc. and the
> authenticity of sense perception and the like in the waking state
> continue as long there is no self knowledge. XI.5
But, then, it is claimed that knowledge of the self is eternal! How can
there be a state of no self-knowledge? And the above is subject to the
error of self-dependency, because the cause and the effect are invoked
in support of each other. Look at it this way: "the authenticity of
sense-perception and the like" are thought real until self-knowledge is
obtained. And when is self-knowledge obtained? When the world of
plurality is not thought to be real, i.e., when sense perception is
not thought to be authentic. A veritable Catch-22 situation.
> In the gauDapaada kaarikaa shaMkara says in the introduction to I.2:
> "The three kinds of experiences in the three states are
> described. All these experiences, in fact, belong to the waking
> state alone. That dreaming and deep sleep have different
> characteristics is known only in the waking state. Further as far as
> the absence of the knowledge of reality is concerned, ** the three
> states are identical ** (emphasis mine). Therefore the three
> apparently different perceivers in the three states are identical
> and their **so-called** distinction is due to their identification
> with the three states."
The second sentence contradicts the first; to say that the experiences
of the *three* states are described, and then to say that all of those
are in fact the experiences of just one state, is contradictory --
unless one accepts that two states are without experience, which is not
the case.
There are several other errors, but no need to make a detailed analysis,
I think. It is easy to see where claims are stated without proof, where
inference rules used do not have bases, and where statements are
contradictory.
> So Kartik wins 2:1. Further, other than in the suutra bhaashhya
> shaMkara does not ascribe a "special reality" to the waking state.
I don't know what exactly "Kartik wins" and what the manner of keeping
score is, but I'd say that these explanations have been rather
insufficient, if I may say so without giving offense.
Regards,
Shrisha Rao
> Ramakrishnan.
