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Re: Issues in mImAmSA, advaita, dvaita.
On 13 June 1995, vidya@cco.caltech.edu (Vidyasankar Sundaresan) wrote:
> Due to time pressures, I haven't been able to contribute anything to
the
> recent discussions among Anand Hudli, Srisha Rao, and Mani
Varadarajan,
> though I have very much wanted to. I would just like to make some
quick
> points -
>
I myself have had to postpone this response, and generally stay away
from all serious discussions, due to a grueling work schedule...
> 1. Mimamsa, Vedanta etc. - Srisha, I get the impression that you
associate
> pUrva mImAmSA primarily with the kArytAvAda of Prabhakara. BhATTa
mImAmSA
> has always been more prominent than Prabhakara's school. And within
the
Not true. Bhaatta miimaamsaa has not been always more prominent, and it
cannot even have been always extant, because if it had been, then why
would it be known by Kumaara-ela Bhatta's name? Someone who propounds an
already-known and widely extant school of thought is unlikely to be
identified with it in so strong a sense.
> original BhATTa mImAmSA, there is not much role for ISwara. Have you
read
> Kumarila Bhatta's Sloka vArtika? It follows a remarkably non-theistic,
and
> sometimes even skeptical path. For that matter, even the nAsadIya
sUkta of
> the Rg Veda is in the tone of questioning, instead of assertion. Any
The role of miimaamsaa is to formulate a set of guidelines for the
explanation of Shruti, just as it is the role of vyaakarana to formulate
a set for the proper use of language. And just as the fact that a
grammar textbook does not generally extol the Lord's virtues in great
detail is not held against it, the fact that Bhatta's work is "non-
theistic" is not a mark against it.
We also have the word of Krishna Himself, that all Vedas extol Him only,
so, even the "tone of questioning" is not considered inappropriate, or
against theism.
> philosophical readjustments that post-Sankaran BhATTa mImAmSa has
done,
> have mainly to do with advaita's objections to it. Sankara's bhashyas
deal
> extensively with pUrva mImAmSa positions on various issues. Advaita is
I don't see why you suppose that Bhaatta miimaamsaa could change -- if
it did, then it simply would not remain Bhaatta miimaamsaa any longer.
This is just as if you change the system created by Whitehead and
Russell, as by dropping a few axioms, and by substituting some for
others, you can still have a system of number theory, but not one that
you can meaningfully call Whitehead and Russell's.
> arrived at after as elaborate a criticism of BhATTa mImAmSA as of,
say,
> vijnAnavAda. I do not know if either Ramanuja or Madhva or any of the
> other later Bhashyakaras have addressed pUrva mImAmSA at all.
>
Madhva has, in the Vishnu-tatva-vinirnaya and elsewhere.
> A second point I would like to make is that mImAmSA means more than
just
> textual exegesis. It implies a deep reflection, and a system of
philosophy
Not true; miimaamsaa is not textual exegesis, agreed, but it is a system
of exegesis of Shruti. There areat least three reasons why miimaamsaa is
confined to Shruti only:
1> We do not need a miimaamsaa to understand a powrusheya vaakya, as
there is the possibility of asking the purusha author what the right
interpretation is, or learning the same from his paramparaa. In the case
of apowrusheya texts, this cannot be done, so we need a miimaamsaa.
2> On a practical level, too, it is commonly accepted that Shruti is
generally harder to understand than most sensible powrusheya vaakyas, so
we again need a miimaamsa more for the former than for the latter.
3> Last but not the least, we accept that unsupported powrusheya vaakyas
do not lead to knowledge of the atiindriya padaarthas; such being the
case, the Shrutis are of naturally higher rank, being the sole
independent authority regarding the atiindriya. As they are special,
their exegesis has to be done differently, or at least more
systematically, than that of louwkika vaakyas.
> based on such reflection. Even if one limits oneself to purely textual
> exegesis, calling Vedanta as uttara mImAmSA is not far beyond the
mark.
It quite certainly is; as I think I said in a posting before, uttara-
miimaamsaa and Vedanta are close entities, but are not identical, just
as the color of a fruit and its state of ripeness are.
> The distinction between the karmakANDa and the jnAnakANDa is clear in
the
> minds of both Jaimini and Badarayana, the two important sUtrakAras,
and
> their respective commentators. The former group would make the
jnAnakANDa
> to be arthavAda, while the latter would make the karmakANDa to be at
best
> preparatory for jnAna. Within the mImAmSa sUtras itself, Badarayana
> disagrees with Jaimini about who is entitled to perform Vedic rituals.
> Jaimini thinks only dvijas are so entitled, which is the traditional
> position, whereas Badarayana thinks all men and women, the whole
genus, is
> entitled - a fairly revolutionary position. Badarayana's differences
with
> Jaimini, and consequently Vedanta's differences with pUrva mImAmSA,
start
> over textual interpretations. As followers of Badarayana, all
Vedantins
> are, to a large extent, uttara mImAmSakas.
Considering Jaimini and Baadaraayana (especially the latter) as
miimaamsakas, is itself a fairly revolutionary position. By the same
token, one could call Krishna a saankhya.
[*chomp*]
> Regarding the discussion that followed, I would like to point out that
> arthApatti - assumed explanation/postulation, is more than a special
case
> of inference, and that anupalabdhi is also not identical to abhAva.
>
> I would translate arthApatti as assumed explanation rather than as
> postulation, mainly because of the rather technical meaning
postulation
> has acquired in science. Even if translated as postulation, arthApatti
> typically involves an extra assumption that need not be supported by
> observations as they are perceived. The statement, Devadatta must be
> eating at night, follows from an assumption that without eating
regularly
> one cannot grow fat. This neglects other ways, for example, a medical
> disorder, that one can grow fat by. Or Devadatta could be on a weight
loss
> program and not eating at all, but still remaining fat because his
adipose
> won't dissolve easily. Such alternative explanations are not
considered in
> arthApatti. None of these are inferences from the stated pratyaksha,
by
> the way, but independent explanations, based on assumptions or on
other
> known facts. ArthApatti can be put to the test, by spying on Devadatta
at
> night, and can be proved or refuted. It's character, therefore, is
quite
> different from that of generic inference.
What you have placed above, or tried to, is a variant of an old
chaarvaaka argument that tries to prove that all logic is useless, since
we cannot ever know all the relevant facts that may influence the
outcome, as need to be assumed in the inference.
One example that comes to mind is this one, which has been quoted by
Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines -- the inference "if kangaroos had no
tails, then they could not stand up," is true, even tho we can conceive
of situations where kangaroos use crutches. What we mean, rather, is
that given the scarcity of crutches for kangaroos, and the
disinclination of kangaroos to use crutches, our inference is valid. So
also, the inference from "piino Devadattaha, divaa na bhunkte," can be
carried thru on the basis that the counterfactual possibilities that you
mention have hardly any chance of coming to pass.
Note, in addition, that the force of your argument is to claim that
arthaapatti needs the support of pratyaksha, in order to be valid, as
otherwise there is no way of knowing its result to be certain. This
position is significantly different from that of all schools of Vedanta,
which deny the possibility of "pariikshaa-anavasthaa" or the infinite
regress of questioning, and claim that a pramaana does not need the
support of another pramaana, for its own praamaanya. Thus, your view is
in opposition to your own school, which is why I do not deal with it
extensively here.
[*chomp*]
> Now to anupalabdhi - the word is better understood, to my mind, as
> non-obtainability. This is admitted as a pramANa by the pUrva and
uttara
> mImAmSakas (except dvaitins?), but not by the naiyAyikas. I am sure
the
As you are perfectly aware, we are not miimaamsakas, either puurva or
uttara; we are just Tatvavaadis.
> Indian philosophers coined this word preceisely in order to
differentiate
> it from abhAva, which is a strong term, capable of suggesting non-
being.
Not true; abhaava can also be used in a weak sense; what you use it here
for is to mean atyantaabhaava, which is the physical state corresponding
to the logical state of atyantaasat. Conversely, anupalabdhi can also be
used in a strong sense; if something exists anywhere, then it is
upalabdha, perhaps not to oneself, but to someone else, or even to
oneself under different conditions. Only things like shasha-shrnga,
vandhyaa-suta, etc., can be anupalabdha under all conditions, which is
the most sensible way of calling something anupalabdha.
> If I enter a room that I have never entered before, I cannot perceive
lack
> or absence of anything at all, e.g. a table. I can only perceive those
Not true; if this were accepted, then you could enter an empty room for
the first time, and not perceive its emptiness. Your position is again
different from that of all schools of Vedanta, which do not accept that
previous experience of the hetu is necessary for perception of abhaava;
perhaps your saying so would bring joy to a Vignyaanavaadi, who would
use it to take you down in three moves or less.
Perhaps what you intend to say is, if you have not previously perceived
of, or known of, an object, then you cannot perceive its absence now.
This can be argued for in a limited sense, but again is not true in the
strictest sense -- we have never perceived, nor ever heard of, a
rabbit's horn, or a childless-woman's son, and yet we perceive their
absence everywhere instantly, even when we enter a room for the first
time.
Therefore, the most that can be said is that if an object, artifact, or
entity has not being either perceived, or conceived of, previously, then
its absence cannot be perceived now. This again is weak, and can be
shown to be wrong, but I won't belabor the point, as we are already
quite far from your initial assertion.
[*chomp*]
> All in all, in such discussions, it is preferable to clarify one's
> terminology and use it consistently, rather than ending up in a debate
> where different people mean different things by the same word. Also,
to
> have a fair debate, it is useful to remember the connotations of a
given
> term that is intended by the pUrvapakshin, in order to make one's own
> position stronger.
Quite sensible.
Regards,
Shrisha Rao
