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Issues in mImAmSA, advaita, dvaita.
Due to time pressures, I haven't been able to contribute anything to the
recent discussions among Anand Hudli, Srisha Rao, and Mani Varadarajan,
though I have very much wanted to. I would just like to make some quick
points -
1. Mimamsa, Vedanta etc. - Srisha, I get the impression that you associate
pUrva mImAmSA primarily with the kArytAvAda of Prabhakara. BhATTa mImAmSA
has always been more prominent than Prabhakara's school. And within the
original BhATTa mImAmSA, there is not much role for ISwara. Have you read
Kumarila Bhatta's Sloka vArtika? It follows a remarkably non-theistic, and
sometimes even skeptical path. For that matter, even the nAsadIya sUkta of
the Rg Veda is in the tone of questioning, instead of assertion. Any
philosophical readjustments that post-Sankaran BhATTa mImAmSa has done,
have mainly to do with advaita's objections to it. Sankara's bhashyas deal
extensively with pUrva mImAmSa positions on various issues. Advaita is
arrived at after as elaborate a criticism of BhATTa mImAmSA as of, say,
vijnAnavAda. I do not know if either Ramanuja or Madhva or any of the
other later Bhashyakaras have addressed pUrva mImAmSA at all.
A second point I would like to make is that mImAmSA means more than just
textual exegesis. It implies a deep reflection, and a system of philosophy
based on such reflection. Even if one limits oneself to purely textual
exegesis, calling Vedanta as uttara mImAmSA is not far beyond the mark.
The distinction between the karmakANDa and the jnAnakANDa is clear in the
minds of both Jaimini and Badarayana, the two important sUtrakAras, and
their respective commentators. The former group would make the jnAnakANDa
to be arthavAda, while the latter would make the karmakANDa to be at best
preparatory for jnAna. Within the mImAmSa sUtras itself, Badarayana
disagrees with Jaimini about who is entitled to perform Vedic rituals.
Jaimini thinks only dvijas are so entitled, which is the traditional
position, whereas Badarayana thinks all men and women, the whole genus, is
entitled - a fairly revolutionary position. Badarayana's differences with
Jaimini, and consequently Vedanta's differences with pUrva mImAmSA, start
over textual interpretations. As followers of Badarayana, all Vedantins
are, to a large extent, uttara mImAmSakas.
2. Anand Hudli's attempts at reconciliation of dvaita and advaita -
Such an attempt is bound to come to nought. Advaitins already agree with
most everything that dvaita says, but only at the vyAvahArika level. As
such, an argument pointing out the "yatra tu dvaitamiva bhavati,...." has
been done by advaitins for centuries now. But then, it is important to
remember that the dvaitins interpret even "yatra sarvamAtmaivAbhUt" in the
light of dvaita. All in all, a reinterpretation of dvaita in the light of
advaita is possible, but you have to give up the doctrine of the five
differences, and such hierarchical subsuming has also been going on for
quite some time. But a reinterpretation of advaita according to dvaita is
just not possible. Unless one asserts simultaneous bheda and abheda, which
is probably an easy escape route, and also capable of multiple
interpretations. If on a personal level, you feel the need to reconcile
the two, viSishTAdvaita is a highly preferable alternative. You need not
be a Srivaishnava to be a viSishTAdvaitin.
Regarding the discussion that followed, I would like to point out that
arthApatti - assumed explanation/postulation, is more than a special case
of inference, and that anupalabdhi is also not identical to abhAva.
I would translate arthApatti as assumed explanation rather than as
postulation, mainly because of the rather technical meaning postulation
has acquired in science. Even if translated as postulation, arthApatti
typically involves an extra assumption that need not be supported by
observations as they are perceived. The statement, Devadatta must be
eating at night, follows from an assumption that without eating regularly
one cannot grow fat. This neglects other ways, for example, a medical
disorder, that one can grow fat by. Or Devadatta could be on a weight loss
program and not eating at all, but still remaining fat because his adipose
won't dissolve easily. Such alternative explanations are not considered in
arthApatti. None of these are inferences from the stated pratyaksha, by
the way, but independent explanations, based on assumptions or on other
known facts. ArthApatti can be put to the test, by spying on Devadatta at
night, and can be proved or refuted. It's character, therefore, is quite
different from that of generic inference.
In modern science, postulation is just not inference. The right inference
"objects in motion must come to rest" was drawn by Aristotle, the master
of logic. It took a Newton to see beyond perception, and postulate
something different. Newton's first law is not an inference from any
ordinary onservation, but is a postulate that is proved after it is
stated, by means of experiment.
Now to anupalabdhi - the word is better understood, to my mind, as
non-obtainability. This is admitted as a pramANa by the pUrva and uttara
mImAmSakas (except dvaitins?), but not by the naiyAyikas. I am sure the
Indian philosophers coined this word preceisely in order to differentiate
it from abhAva, which is a strong term, capable of suggesting non-being.
If I enter a room that I have never entered before, I cannot perceive lack
or absence of anything at all, e.g. a table. I can only perceive those
things that are present in that room. I have no way of knowing if there
was a table in that room yesterday, but which is not there today. On the
other hand, I can enter a familiar room, which I remember to have had a
table, but I do not see a table today. But then, it seems to me that I
again cannot perceive "lack of table" as a positive entity. I only
correlate my earlier memory with what I see now in that room, and make a
negative statement to the effect that "the table (that I remember from the
past) is not there (now)" - my statement is never "Absence of table is
there". Anupalabdhi is precisely that - not obtaining an expected
perception. It does not mean abhAva. Anupalabdhi leaves room for doubt -
the table could still be there, but moved to some place so that I can't
see it at once. Similarly, when a magician makes something disappear from
your sight, that thing is only anupalabdha, it cannot be said to have
entered the limbo of abhAva. Anupalabdhi is therefore a term with a weaker
significance, and is not the same as abhAva.
All in all, in such discussions, it is preferable to clarify one's
terminology and use it consistently, rather than ending up in a debate
where different people mean different things by the same word. Also, to
have a fair debate, it is useful to remember the connotations of a given
term that is intended by the pUrvapakshin, in order to make one's own
position stronger.
Regards,
S. Vidyasankar
